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FEDERAL TAX CONSEQUENCES OF ALIMONY AND
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS
PAUL D. LAGOmAXCIiO*
Prior to the Revenue Act of 19421 payments of alimony or
payments in lieu of alimony caused no complicated federal tax
consequences. The rule was clear. Payments made under a volun-
tary separation agreement alone' or pursuant to a decree of sepa-
ration from bed and board or decree of absolute divorce4 did not
constitute taxable income to the wife. Consequently, the husband
was taxed upon his entire net income, even though a substantial
portion may have been paid to his wife as alimony or for separate
maintenance.
Gould v. Gould5 was the leading case. A New York State
court had issued a decree of separation from bed and board be-
tween the parties and ordered the husband to make monthly sup-
port payments to the wife. The issue presented was whether these
payments constituted income to the wife within the meaning of the
term in the Tariff Act of 1913.
6
The United States Supreme Court based its decision upon an
interpretation of the term "net income" in the statute. In general,
the Tariff Act of 1913 defined net income as gain from salaries or
for personal services, monies received from a profession or busi-
ness, profit from dealings in property, or from interest, rent or
dividends. The Court stated that the payments did not fall
"within any of the terms employed" in the statutory definition.
Instead, it said, alimony arose " 'from the relation of marriageI "
and was to be regarded " 'rather as a portion of the husband's
estate to which the wife is equitably entitled.' "7
Accordingly, the Court held:
". .. the sum received by the wife . . . cannot be regarded
as income arising or accruing to her within the enactment." 8
*Trial Attorney, Internal Revenue Service, Buffalo, New York.
The statements contained herein reflect the views of the author
alone and do not necessarily represent the position of the Internal
Revenue Service or the Treasury Department.
1. 56 Stat. 798 (1942).
2. Jane B. Coates, 3 B. T. A. 429 (1926) Acq., V-1 Cum. BULL. 2 (1926).
3. Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151 (1917), affirmig, 168 App. Div. 900, 152 N. Y. S.
1114 (1st Dep't 1915).
4. Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis, 37 B. T. A. 41 (1938).
5. See note 3 supra.
6. Section II B, 38 Stat. 116 (1913).
7. Quoting from Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575 (1917), which held that
alimony was not a provable debt in bankruptcy and was not barred by a discharge in
bankruptcy.
8. 245 U. S. at 154. The Court undoubtedly was also influenced by the lack of a
provision in the statute permitting the husband a deduction for such payments. Any
other determination, therefore, would have resulted in double taxation of the amounts
paid.
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In dictum, it stated:
"The net income of the divorced husband subject to taxation
was not decreased by payment of alimony . . ."
The tax consequences of this decision worked a genuine hard-
ship on the husband in a large number of cases in the years follow-
ing, but it was not until consideration of the Revenue Act of 1942
that any corrective action was taken. Increased surtax rates we Vc
proposed to help finance World War II. Congress recognized that
"the increased surtax rates would intensify this hardship" on the
husband and, equally important, it feared that "in many cases the
husband would not have sufficient income left after paying alimony
to meet his income tax obligations.'' 9 For these reasons, in the
Revenue Act of 1942, Congress enacted the present sections 22(k)
and 23(u) of the Code, together with other amendments or addi-
tions to existing sections.10
Section 22(k) pertains to the inclusion of payments in the
nature of alimony into the gross income of the wife. n' It provides
9. H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1942), 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 372.
Furthermore, it was entirely possible that alimony payments and income tax could exceed
100% of the husband's actual income and the husband would be legally bound to pay
more than he earned. It was this kind of argument that prevailed in Congress in
amending the Stuart case rule (Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154 (1942)) in 1943 by
the present § 167(c) of the Code. Adoption of the proposed amendments had been
recommended by the Treasury Department in order to relieve "hardships and inequities".
(See Statement of Randolph Paul, Tax Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury, Hearings
Before the Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1942).
Congress further sought to "produce uniformity in the treatment of amounts paid
in the nature of and in lieu of alimony regardless of variance in the laws of different
states concerning the existence and continuance of an obligation to pay alimony." H. R.
REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1942), -1942-2 Cum. BULL. 372, 427; SEN. REP. No.
1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 504, 568. This lack of uniformity
was a particularly vexsome matter from a federal tax standpoint where an alimony trust
was involved.
10. Section 22(b) (2). The provisions of this section and § 22(b) (1) do not
apply to a payment under a life insurance, endowment, or annuity policy, includible in
gross income under § 22(k); § 25(b) (3) ("A payment to a wife which is includible
under section 22(k) or section 171 in the gross income of such wife shall not be con-
sidered a payment by her husband for the support of any dependent."); § 3797 (a) (17)
provides that the words "husband" and "wife", as used in § 22(k), § 23(u), § 171 and
the above-quoted part of § 25(b) (3) are interchangeable and also include the terms
"former husband" and "former wife". Section 171 freed the husband from tax on cer-
tain trust income received by his divorced or legally separated wife. The "alimony trust"
is beyond the scope of this article.
Divorce and legal separation also raise questions under § 25(b) (2) (exemption
for spouse of taxpayer), § 51 (b) (filing of joint returns). See note 24 infra.
Sections 22(k) and 23(u) apply to payments received in 1942 and later years,
regardless of the date of entry of the decree of divorce or separate maintenance. See
note 50 infra.
11. Although the section contemplates payments by the husband to the wife, it
also applies, however, where the roles are reversed. INT. REv. CODE, §3797(a)(17).
Thus, a husband may be taxed upon alimony received by him and a wife may deduct
such payments made by her.
It is assumed herein that the wife is both the aggrieved party and the recipient of
the payments.
Section 7701 (a) (17) of the proposed Internal Revenue Code of 1954 defines the
words "husband" and "wife".
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that, where five prescribed conditions are satisfied, payments to a
divorced or legally separated wife "shall be includible in the gross
income" of the wife.:2 These conditions or requirements are
discussed later in this article. It is immaterial whether the pay-
ments are attributable to property in trust, to life insurance, en-
dowment or annuity contracts, or to any other interest in property,
or are paid directly or indirectly by the husband from his income or
capital.3 For the purposes of this section the wife is treated as
though she makes her income tax returns on a cash receipts and
disbursements basis, regardless of whether she normally makes
her return on an accrual basis. 14 Accordingly, payments are iu-
cludible in the wife's income in the taxable year in which she
actually receives them. 5 Section 22(k) provides, however, that it
shall not apply to any part of a periodic payment which a decree
or written instrument "fix, in terms of an amount of money or a
12. Section 22(k) provides: "In the case of a wife who is divorced or legally
separated from her husband under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance,
periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received subsequent to
such decree in discharge of, or attributable to property transferred (in trust or other-
wise) in discharge of, a legal obligation which, because of the marital or family relation-
ship, is imposed upon or incurred by such husband under such decree or a written in-
strument incident to such divorce or separation shall be includible in the gross income
of such wife, and such amounts received as are attributable to property so transferred
shall not be includible in the gross income of such husband. This subsection shall not
apply to that part of any such periodic payment which the terms of the decree or written
instrument fix, in terms of an amount of money or a portion of the payment, as a sum
which is payable for the support of minor children of such husband. In case any such
periodic payment is less than the amount specified in the decree or written instrument,
for the purpose of applying the preceding sentence, such payment, to the extent of such
sum payable for such support, shall be considered a payment for such support. Install-
ment payments discharging a part of an obligation the principal sum of which is, in
terms of money or property, specified in the decree or instrument shall not be considered
periodic payments for the purposes of this subsection; except that an installment pay-
ment shall be considered a periodic payment for the purposes of this subsection if such
principal ium, by the terms of the decree or instrument, may be or is to be paid within
a period ending more than 10 years from the date of such decree or instrument, but only
to the extent that such installment payment for the taxable year of the wife (or if more
than one such installment payment for such taxable year is received during such taxable
year, the aggregate of such installment payments) does not exceed 10 per centum of
such principal sum. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, the portion of a
payment of the principal sum which is allocable to a period after the taxable year of the
wife in which it is received shall be considered an installment payment for the taxable
year in which it is received. (In cases where such periodic payments are attributable
to property of an estate or property held in trust, see section 171 (b)."
Section 22(k) was held constitutional in Mahana v. United States, 88 F. Supp.
285 (Ct. Cl. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 978 (1950). See Daisy M. Twinam, 22
T. C. - No. 13 (1954). In addition, "validity of the legislation has been postulated by
each court which has dealt with the question." Fairbanks v. Commissioner, 191 F. 2d 680
(9th Cir. 1951).
13. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(k) -1- (b).
14. Id. at § 39.22(k)-1-(a) (6).
15. Except, however, for payments received from an estate or trust which "are to be
included in the wife's taxable year in which they are includible according to the rules as
to income of estates or trusts." Ibid. See Lily R. Reighley, 17 T. C. 344 (1951) ("...
the year of the wife for the inclusion of periodic payments th be paid to her by a trust
will be the year in which she constructively receives the payments . . .", regardless
whether she actually receives them in the year.) (Emphasis added.)
181
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portion of the payment, as a sum . . . payable for the support of
minor children" of the husband.
Complementing section 22(k), section 23(u) deals with the
deduction by the husband of payments to his former wife. This
section permits the .husband to deduct only those "amounts in-
cludible under section 22(k) in the gross income of the wife . . .
and it thereby premises ". . . the exemption of the husband . . .
upon the corresponding liability of the wife . . . "17 The deduc-
tion, where proper, may be taken from the adjusted gross income
of the husband, rather than from gross income. It may not be
taken if the husband uses the optional tax table or elects to take
the standard deduction. In other words, it is a so-called "page
three" or "miscellaneous" deduction. The regulations also treat
the husband as though he makes his income tax returns on a casn
receipts and disbursements basis, regardless of the accounting
method normally employed by him. 8 Thus, the husband may de-
duct only those payments actually made in the taxable year,
rather than the amount of payments for which he became liable
during the year. 9
By no means was it intended that all payments by a husband
to a former wife should be deductible by him. Clearly, the relief
given the husband was partial only. First, a deduction under sec-
tion 23(u) was conditioned upon the satisfaction of five criteria
specified in section 22(k) and, by their nature, not all types of
payments could satisfy these criteria. Second, Congress undoubt-
edly was aware that the section would be accorded the construc-
tion given any provision for a deduction and, hence, precise and
16. Section 2 3(u) allows as a deduction: "In the case of a husband described in
section 22(k), amounts includible under section 22 (k) in the gross income of his wife,
payment of which is made within the husband's taxable year. If the amount of any
such payment is, under section 22(k) or section 171, stated to be not includible in such
husband's gross income, no deduction shall be allowed with respect to such payment
under this subsection."
17. Charles L. Brown, 7 T. C. 715 (1946) ; accord, Bertram Levy, 7 T. C. M.
272 (1948); Abraham L. Berman, 6 T. C. M. 1325 (1947). See Ray W. Droke, 12
T. C. M. 702 (1953) ("Alimony payments . . . by a husband are not deductible under
section 2 3(u) of the Code unless the amounts are includible in gross income of the
wife under section 22(k).") However, a provision in an agreement between the parties
that the payments shall be taxable to the wife does not necessarily make them deductible
by the husband. The tax consequences of payments, insofar as the federal government
is concerned, depends solely upon the provisions of the statute. Frank R. Casey, 12
T. C. 224 (1949). The same result follows when the husband has agreed to pay
federal income tax on money paid by him to the wife. Muriel Dodge Neeman, 13 T. C.
397 (1949), aff'd per curiam, Neenan v. Commissioner, 200 F. 2d 560 (2d Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 345 U. S. 956 (1953).
18. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, §3923(u)-1.
19. Ibid. In Lily R. Reighley, supra note 15, the Court said:
"Under the statutory provision the year of the wife in which the periodic
payments must be included and the year of the husband in which he may take
deduction for the payments is the year of actual payment, even though either
or both the wife and the husband report income on an accrual basis."
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literal compliance with the five criteria would be required."'
Third, in any action involving the propriety of the deduction, the
burden of proof ordinarily would be borne by the husband.2 1
Finally, even where these criteria were met, financial relief might
be limited, since the deduction could be taken only from the ad-
justed gross income. Depending upon the adjusted gross income
of the husband, the amount of the payments and the remaining de-
ductions available, the husband might realize a saving in tax by
waiving his right to the deduction and by electing to take the
standard ten per cent deduction instead.
Section 22(k) applies, and hence, a deduction under section
23(u) may properly be claimed, only where it can be shown clearly
that:
1. The wife is "divorced or legally separated from her
husband under a decree of divorce or of separate mainte-
nance";
2. The payments are "periodic . . . (whether or not made at
regular intervals) . . .";
3. The payments are in discharge of a legal obligation grow-
ing out of the "marital or family" relationship;
4. The payments are in discharge of a legal obligation im-
posed on the husband by a decree of divorce or legal
separation or incurred by the husband under a written
instrument "incident to" either such decree;
5. The payments have been received "subsequent to" the
decree of divorce or of separate maintenance.
Currently, Congress is engaged in a comprehensive revision of
existing internal revenue law. Proposed changes are embodied in
H. R. 8300, also called "The Internal Revenue Code of 1954.."
Section 71 of the proposed Code relates to the inclusion of pay-
ments in the nature of alimony and separate maintenance into the
20. Frank .. DuBane, 10 T. C. 992 (1948) (Petitioner "must bring himself squarely
within that provision to succeed ...Although this may be rather narrow and technical,
nevertheless, the letter of the law has not been met and provisions granting deductions
are not to be liberally construed in favor of taxpayers.") ; accord, Ned Fuller, 8 T. C. M.
889 (1949) (Here the Court said that "the statute governing the deductions . . . is
specific and to authorize a deduction a taxpayer must comply precisely with it.").
A Court of Appeals has also said that, although "the statutes are remedial", none-
theless "there is no reason for concluding that the statutes should be construed liberally
in the husband's favor as against the wife." Mandel v. Commissioner, 185 F. 2d 50
(7th Cir. 1950), affirming, Leon Mandel, 8 T. C. M. 445 (1949).
21. Ned Fuller, supra note 20; Frederick S. Dauwalier, 9 T. C. 580 (1947). See
Rule 32, Rules of Practice Before The Tax Court of the United States (1954).
183
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gross income of the wife.22  Complementing section 71, section 215
of the proposed Code allows the husband "as a deduction [from
22. The proposed section 71, in the form in which it was passed by the House of
Representatives, provides:
"SEC. 71. ALIMONY AND SEPARATE MAINTENANCE PAY-
MENTS.
(a) GENERAL RULE.-
(1) DEcREE OF DIVORCE OR SEPARATE MAINTENANcE.-If a wife is
divorced or legally separated from her husband under a decree of divorce
or of separate maintenance, the wife's gross income includes periodic pay-
ments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received after such
decree in discharge of (or attributable to property transferred, in trust or
otherwise, in discharge of) a legal obligation which, because of the marital
or family relationship, is imposed on or incurred by the husband under the
decree or under a written instrument incident to such divorce or separation.
(2) WRITTEN SEPARATION AGREEENT.-If a wife is separated from
her husband and there is a written separation agreement, the wife's gross
income includes periodic payments (whether or not made at regular in-
tervals) received after such agreement is executed which are made under
such agreement and because of the marital or family relationship (or which
are attributable to property transferred, in trust or otherwise, under such
agreement and because of such relationship). This paragraph shall not
apply if the husband and wife make a single return jointly.
(b) PAYMENTS TO SUPPORT MINOR CHILDREN.-Subsection (a) shall not
apply to that part of any payment which the terms of the decree, instrument,
or agreement fix, in terms of an amount of money or a part of the payment,
as a sum which is payable for the support of minor children of the husband.
For purposes of the preceding sentence, if any payment is less than the
amount specified in the decree, instrument, or agreement, then so much of such
payment as does not exceed the sum payable for support shall be considered a
payment for such support.
(c) PRINCIPAL SuM PAID IN INSTALLMENTS.-
(1) GENERAL RuLE.-For purposes of subsection (a), installment pay-
ments discharging a part of an obligation the principal sum of which is,
either in terms of money or property, specified in the decree, instrument,
or agreement shall not be treated as periodic payments.
(2) WHmE PERIOD FOR PAYMENT IS MORE THAN 10 YEARS.-If, by
the terms of the decree, instrument, or agreement, the principal sum referred
to in paragraph (1) is to be paid or may be paid over a period ending
more than 10 years from the date of such decree, instrument, or agree-
ment, then (notwithstanding paragraph (1)) the installment payments
shall be treated as periodic payments for purposes of subsection (a), but
(in the case of any one taxable year of the wife) only to the extent of
10 percent of the principal sum. For purposes of the preceding sentence,
the part of any principal sum which is allocable to a period after the taxable
year of the wife in which it is received shall be treated as an installment
payment for the taxable year in which it is received.
(d) RULE FOR HUSBAND IN CASE OF TRANSFERRED PROPERTY.-The hus-
band's gross income does not include amounts received which, under sub-
section (a), are (1) includible in the gross income of the wife, and (2) at-
tributable to transferred property.
(e) CRoss REFERENCES.-
(1) For definitions of "husband" and "wife", see section 7701 (a)
(2) For deduction by husband of periodic payments not attributable
to transferred property, see section 215.
(3) For taxable status of income of an estate or trust in case of
divorce, etc., see section 682."
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adjusted gross income] amounts includible under section 71 in
the gross income of his wife."
23
With one exception, the various subsections of section 71
merely reenact, -with few and inconsequential changes in language,
the provisions of section 22(k) of the present Code. The five re-
quirements conditioning the applicability of section 22(k) appear
in substantially identical form in section 71 (a) (1) of the proposed
Code. The remaining provisions of section 22(k) appear in other
subsections of section 71.
The single change of substance relates to payments made
under a written separation agreement not incident to a decree of
court. Such payments would not satisfy the requirements of sec-
tion 22(k) of the present Code, nor of section 71(a) (1) of the pro-
posed Code. Section 71(a) (2) of the proposed Code, however, is
in the nature of an exception to the general rule expressed in sec-
tion 71(a) (1). It provides that such payments shall be treated as
income taxable to the wife under certain circumstances specified
therein.
If enacted, the proposed Code will apply to taxable years be-
ginning after December 31, 1953. Regardless of congressional ac-
tion on the proposed Code, the present section 22(k) will apply to
prior years not closed by the various periods of limitations. Con-
sequently, both sections are discussed hereafter.
The application of the present section 22(k) and of the pro-
posed section 71(a) (1) is conditioned upon the satisfaction of five
substantially identical requirements. These requirements, as
construed by the courts in section 22(k) cases, are discussed in
the order previously set forth.
L Divorce or Legal Separation "Under a Decree of Divorce
or of Separate Maintenance."
Section 22(k) and the proposed section 71(a)(1) apply only
where the wife is "divorced or legally separated from her hus-
23. The proposed section 215, in the form in which it was passed by the House of
Representatives, provides:
SEC. 215. ALIMONY, ETC., PAYMENTS.
(a) GENEMAL RuLE.-In the case of a husband described in section 71,
there shall be allowed as a deduction amounts includible under section 71
in the gross income of his wife, payment of which is made within the hus-
band's taxable year. No deduction shall be allowed under the preceding sen-
tence with respect to any payment if, by reason of section 71 (d) or 682,
the amount thereof is not includible in the husband's gross income.
(b) CROSS ilmmxcE.-
For definitions of "husband" and "wife", see section 7701 (a) (17).
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band under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance." 24
The sections unmistakably require "the intervention of some sort
of judicial sanction for an alteration in the marital status."2
A voluntary separation agreement does not satisfy the require-
ment 26 and consequently payments made pursuant to such an
agreement are not deductible by the husband. 7  Although a "de-
cree" of court is a requisite, it does not follow, merely because a
court orders payments to a wife, that this requirement of the sec-
tion has been met. A decree ordering a husband to make payments
stipulated in a voluntary separation agreement or to pay arrear-
24. This particular requirement and cases involving it should aid in the construc-
tion of § 51 (b) of the present Code. This latter section permits a husband and wife to
file a joint return, but provides that "an individual who is legally separated from his
spouse under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance shall not be considered as
married." See Marriner S. Eccles, 19 T. C. 1049 (1953) Nonacq.. 1953-15 Cu'm. BULL. 1,
aff'd per curiam, Commissioner v. Eccles, 208 F. 2d 769 (4th Cir. 1953).
The above-quoted language is also found in § 25(b) (2) of the present Code, which
relates to an exemption "for the spouse of the taxpayer" where a "separate return is
made by the taxpayer."
In SEN. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), 1948-1 Cum. BULL. 285, 324,
it was stated, in connection with section 25(b) (2), that "the rule with respect to the
marital status of an individual . . . is derived from a corresponding provision in
section 22(k) of the Code" and that section 25(b) (2) and section 51(b) should be
given "uniform construction".
25. Charles L. Brown, supra note 17; accord, Daine v. Commissioner, 168 F. 2d
449 (2d Cir. 1948), affirming, Robert L. Daine, 9 T. C. 47 (1947) ; Angelo Frascone,
8 T. C. M. 377 (1949). Cf. Edgar Jodoin, 12 T. C. M. 1048 (1953) (An order by the
Commandant of the Marine Corps to an officer therein to male certain monthly pay-
ments to the officer's estranged wife is not the equivalent of a court decree, regardless
of the consequences of a failure to comply by the officer.)
26. Bertram Levy, supra note 17; see Max D. Melville, 8 T. C. M. 934 (1949)
(No defense that wife's religious beliefs prevent seeking divorce or legal separation.).;
Almerindo Portfolio, 54 1 U. S. T. C. 19192 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (Immaterial that wife origi-
nally brought action for legal separation and judge of divorce court persuaded her to
enter into a voluntary separation agreement instead.)
27. Smith v. Commissioner, 168 F. 2d 446 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Joseph C. Briqhtbill,
8 T. C. M. 112 (1949), aff'd per curiam, 178 F. 2d 404 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Charles L. Brown,
supra note 17; George D. Wick, 7 T. C. 723 (1946), aff'd, Wick v. Commissioner, 161
F. 2d 732 (3rd Cir. 1947). In the Smith case the Court held: "The payments here
were not court decreed obligations, and hence the taxpayer does not come within the
statutory terms . . .His obligations arose from the agreement. That is not enough.
They must be obligations imposed under a decree." (168 F. 2d at 447). The Court also
rejected the argument that "under the law of New York a separation by contract . .
is the full equivalent of a separation by judicial decree", because the statute required a
decree and to hold otherwise would defeat the uniformity intended by Congress in the
treatment of payments to a wife regardless of variance in state laws. Accord, regarding
the effect of a New York separation agreement, Robert L. Daine, supra note 25; Harold
W. Hoyt, 7 T. C. M. 104 (1948) ; Bertram Levy, supra note 17. It is immaterial that
the voluntary separation agreement was entered into prior to and in contemplation of
divorce or separation and actually followed by either decree. Robert L. Dame, supra;
Joseph D. Fox, 14 T. C. 1131 (1950) ; Bertram Levy, supra; Robert Barry, 7 T. C. M.
50 (1948) ; Abraham L. Berman, supra note 17. Such payments are defective for the
additional reason that they have been made prior to, rather than "subsequent to", the
decree of court, as required by the statute. Joseph D. Fox, supra; Robert Barry, supra;
Abraham L. Berman, supra.
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ages or otherwise to :comply with its terms "is not sufficient in
itself to bring a case within the terms" of the section.
8
The section applies only to a wife "divorced or legally separ-
ated from her husband under a decree of divorce or of separate
maintenance" and only payments pursuant to these two types of
decrees qualify. The Treasury Department has ruled that the
term "divorce", as it is used in these sections, does not include a
decree of annulment of marriage, which voids the marriage ab
initio.29 The term refers only to an absolute or final divorce.8 0
For this reason payments made under a decree which must be
followed by a waiting period before the divorce is absolute, as, for
example, an interlo'cutory decree, have been held by the Tax
Court not to qualify.31 Whether the decree is absolute or merely
interlocutory depends upon the provisions of state law.8
The remaining type of decree recognized is one of "separate
maintenance" under which the wife is "legally separated" from
the husband. A particular decree must have this dual legal effect.
The "section was intended to apply only to persons . . . legally
separated under a decree authorizing their separation and provid-
ing for separate maintenance of the wife." 38  (Emphasis added)
28. Terrell v. Commissioner, 179 F. 2d 838 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S.
828 (1950); Bernarr MacFadden, 7 T. C. M. 147 (1948), appeal dismissed by United
States Court of Appeals for Second Circuit on November 10, 1948. In the Terrell case
the Court said: "Thus, it seems clear that a court order or decree entered to enforce
an agreement or contract of separation is not sufficient in itself to bring a case within
the terms of section 23(u), there must be a decree of divorce or separation and the
obligation of payment by the taxpayer must be imposed under that decree or under a
written instrument incident to the decree or divorce or separation."
29. Special Ruling, December 8, 1944, 454 C. C. H. FED. TAX REP. f 6092. The
title of the decree is not conclusive, however. A decree of annulment satisfied where
it was, in effect, a decree of divorce. Lily R. Reighley, supra note 15.
30. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(k) -- (a) (4), Example (2); Marriner S.
Eccles, supra note 24.
31. Alice Humphreys Evans . 19 T. C. 1102 (1953) Nonacq., 1953-16 Cum. BULL. 1.
See Marriner S. Eccles, supra note 24; S. B. Tressler, 12 T. C. M. 358 (1953).
On the other hand, the Commissioner has ruled differently. California law pro-
vides for the entry of interlocutory decrees of divorce between the parties, and, after
passage of one year, the Court may enter a final decree of divorce. Permanent alimony
may be awarded and such an award is to be made by the interlocutory decree. The
Bureau has ruled that, where the interlocutory decree awards alimony for an indefinite
period of time, such amounts received under the interlocutory decree constitute periodic
payments under the Act. (I. T. 3761, 1945 Cum. BuLL. 76; I. T. 3944, 1949-1 Cum.
BULL. 56). However, where the interlocutory decree orders payments only for the
twelve months duration of the decree, or a definite period of time, the payments are
installment payments. (I. T. 3934, 1949-1 Cum. BuLL. 54; 1. T. 3944, 1949-1 Cum.
Bull. 56). Implicit in these rulings is a finding that an interlocutory decree is a
decree of divorce within the meaning of the statute.
32. Marriner S. Eccles, supra note 24; see Alice Humphrey Evans, supra note 31.
33. Isidore Goodman, 8 T. C. M. 547 (1949); accord., Angelo Frascone, supra
note 25. In the Frascone case a decree by a state "Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court" ordering payments "for the support and maintenance" of the wife did not qualify.
The Court lacked jurisdiction to grant a divorce or legal separation and did not purport
to issue either decree. The function of the Court was to prevent wives and children
from becoming public charges by compelling husbands to fulfill their obligation to
support.
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Consequently, payments under a decree of support or separate
maintenance alone do not qualify.3 4  Such a decree "does not ex-
pressly authorize the -wife to live apart from her husband.'"'5
A decree of temporary alimony or alimony pendente lite,
issued prior to a decree of divorce or legal separation, has neither
such legal effect. It is "not a decree of separate maintenance as
that phrase is used in section 22(k)", nor is it "in its legal effect,
a decree of legal separation.13  The courts have repeatedly held
such payments not deductible by the husband. 7 Similarly, it has
been found that, under the law of the state involved, an interlocu-
tory decree of divorce was not the equivalent of a legal separation
under a decree of separate maintenance.
38
II. Payments must be "periodic . . . (whether or not made
at Regular Intervals) . . . "
Section 22(k) and the proposed section 71 distinguish by
definition between a "periodic" payment and an "installment"
34. Ibid.; accord, Frank J. Kalchthaler, 7 T. C. 625 (1946); W. L. H. Bergen,
10 T. C. M. 865 (1951) ; Roy TV. Droke, supra note 17 (Support decree by Tennessee
Court in April, 1946, and absolute divorce obtained by husband in Nevada in September,
1946. No decree of divorce or separation issued by Tennessee court during subsequent
taxable years in issue. Held: payments pursuant to Tennessee decree were non-
deductible.)
35. Frank I. Kalchthaler, supra note 34. Moreover, "that the parties were in
fact separated does not suffice." Edward S. Gerrish, 12 T. C. M. 594 (1953) (Emphasis
added).
In the Kalchthaler case the Tax Court stated that section 22 (k):
"relates to periodic payments made under a decree of separate maintenance
to a wife who is legally separated or divorced from her husband, but that it
does not apply to a decree of separate maintenance made To a wife who is
not legally separated or divorced. An action for separate maintenance is
not an action for legal separation, generally speaking. The object of the
former is to compel a husband to provide support, and the decree of separate
maintenance and/or support does not expressly authorize a wife to live
apart from her husband. On the other hand, a decree of separation from
bed and board authorizes a wife to live apart from her husband."
Moreover, it is immaterial that a contractual separation may have the legal effect of
a separation by court decree under the law of a particular state. It nonetheless does
not qualify. Smith v. Commissioner, supra note 27; see Terrell v. Commissioner, supra
note 28; Bernarr MacFadden, supra note 28. In the Smith case the Court stated:
"Indeed, to give a separation agreement entered into in New York this special treat-
ment would be to defeat the uniformity intended by the Act." (168 F. 2d at 448).
36. George D. Wick, supra note 27.
37. Ibid.; Robert A. McKinney, 16 T. C. 916 (1951) ; Joseph A. Fields. 14 T. C.
1202 (1950), aff'd, Field v. Commissioner, 189 F. 2d 950 (2d Cir. 1951). See Estate
of Edwin F. Borden, 9 T. C. M. 630 (1950). See also S. B. Tressler, supra note 31,
in which it was stated that payments under a "Bill of Alimony Unconnected with Di-
vorce" should receive the same treatment as alimony pendente life or payments under
an interlocutory decree of divorce. Such payments fail for the additional reason that
they are not made subsequent to the decree of divorce. George D. Wick, slpra note 27.
See U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22 (k) -1- (a) (4), Example (1) : "W sues H
for divorce in 1942. The court awards W temporary alimony of $25 a week pending
the final decree . . . No part Df the $25 a week temporary alimony received prior to
the decree is includible in W's income under section 22(k)."
38. Marriner S. Eccles, supra note 24.
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payment in partial discharge of an obligation to pay d certain total
amount to the wife. Section 22(k) provides that only "periodic
payments . . . shall be includible in the gross income of such
wife" and that "installment payments . . . shall not be con-
sidered periodic payments . . ." Consequently, the Courts have
held installment payments "are not taxable to the divorced wife
as income . . ., nor are they deductible by the husband." '39
Section 22(k) defines "periodic" only to the extent that a
payment may be periodic "whether or not made at regular inter-
vals." Its meaning doubtless never will be entirely ;lear. The
Tax Court has stated that "periodic" is to be given its ordinary
meaning.40 Yet this is impossible, since the very element of
regularity which characterizes the word, has been eliminated as a
criterion by the statutory provision that a payment may be pe-
riodic "whether or not made at regular intervals.
M1
In any event, where payments are to be made at regular, fixed
intervals there is no problem. Payments made weekly or monthly
or at some other regular interval are clearly periodic payments
under the statute.42 If the other conditions of section 22(k) are
satisfied, these amounts are deductible from the income of the hus-
band. On the other hand, the rule is clear that a single or lump
sum payment is non-deductible. The "word 'periodic' . . . ex-
cludes a payment not to be made at fixed intervals but in a lump
sum". 43 The word "distinguishes any payment standing
alone." 44 Hence, it has been held, a single or lump sum payment
"does not fall within the purview of section 22(k)" and the hus-
39. James M. Fidler, 11 T. C. M. 1128 (1952).
40. Ralph Morton. 16 T. C. 1216 (1951), aff'd, Norton v. Commissioner, 192 F.
2d 960 (8th Cir. 1951); Jean Cattier, 17 T. C. 1461 (1952). The ordinary meaning
given by Webster's New International Dictionary, quoted frequently by the Tax Court,
includes "characterized by periods; occurring at regular stated times; happening, or
appearing, at fixed intervals." Arthur B. Baer, 16 T. C. 1418 (1951), modified and
remanded on another point, Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F. 2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952);
Ralph Morton, supra.
41. The Court attempted to surmount the lack of a workable definition and the
impossibility of actually using the word's ordinary meaning by means of the paraphrase.
"Periodic" payments also mean "payments in sequence"; Arthur B. Baer, supra note 38:
or in "series", Gale v. Commissioner, 191 F. 2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951), affirming, Elsie B.
Gale, 13 T. C. 661 (1949).
42. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.22(k)-l-(a) (4), Example (1). See also
Antoinette C. Holahan, 21 T. C. No. 57 (1954); Elizabeth E. Guggenheim, 16 T. C.
1561 (1951) ; Tuckie G. Hesse, 7 T. C. 700 (1946) ; George T. Brady, 10 T. C. 1192
(1948) Acq., 1948-2 Cums. BuLL. 1; Bertram G. Zilmer, 16 T. C. 365 (1951) Acq.,
1951-1 Cu . BULL. 3.
43. Ralph Norton, supra note 40.
44. Arthur B. Baer, supra note 40.
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band "may not deduct any part of it.'" It is immaterial that the
lump sum is paid as a full discharge of an obligation to make
periodic payments in the future.46
Occasionally the question has arisen as to the treatment to be
accorded arrearages in periodic payments which are subsequently
paid in a lump sum. Does such an amount constitute a deductible
periodic payment by the husband, or, is it non-deductible as a lump
sum or single payment? In Estate of Sarah L. Narischkine4 7
the Tax Court held that "arrearages retain their original char-
acter." Accordingly, if the amounts in arrear "would have con-
stituted periodic payments bad they been paid when due, the re-
ceipt of such arrears, even though in a lump or aggregate sum,
must be regarded as the receipt of a periodic payment."48  Along
the same lines, the Court has treated the payment of a retroactive
increase in periodic payments for prior years as a periodic pay-
ment, even though the entire amount of the increase was paid in
one taxable year.4 9  As a consequence of these decisions, the wife
must include the payment for past years in her taxable income in
the single year of receipt.5 0
45. Frank I. Lovcrin, 10 T. C. 406 (1948); accord, Arthur B. Baer, supra note
38. See William M. Haag, 17 T. C. 55 (1951). Nor may a husband deduct a lump
sum payment merely because it was deposited in escrow and made payable to the
wife at the end of a certain period, or sooner, if required by her. Joseph D. Fox, supra
note 25. See Pappenheimer v. Allen, 164 F. 2d 428 (5th Cir. 1947), aflrming, 71 F.
Supp. 788 (D. Ga. 1947), in which it was held that a husband may not deduct as a
periodic payment the monthly rental value of a home owned by him, but occupied by
the wife under the terms of the divorce decree. The Court said that such a "payment" is"not periodic, but is a single right to occupy."
46. Frank J. Loverin, suPra note 45.
47. 14 T. C. 1128 (1950), aff'd. per curiam, Estate of Narischkine v. Commis-
sioner, 189 F. 2d 257 (2d Cir. 1951).
48. Ibid.; accord, Jane C. Grant, 18 T. C. 1013 (1952), aff'd, Grant v. Cominis-
sioner, 209 F. 2d 430 (2d Cir. 1953); Antoinette L. Holahan, supra note 42 (Wife ac-
cepted lesser amount in discharge of larger amount of arrearages in periodic payments
due. Held: periodic payment).
Section 22(k) speaks in terms of payments "received" by the wife. In the context
of the payment of the arrearages in a lump sum, the Court in the Narischkine case said
that the word "'received' . . . includes the right to receive such payments." The Com-
missioner agrees with this interpretation of the Court. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22 (k) -
1-(c) (2), Example (3).
49. Elsie B. Gale, supra note 41. It has also been held that where a husband
transfers securities intended to yield an amount equal to the husband's annual payment,
the subsequent payment by the husband of the deficit or difference between the smaller
actual yield and intended greater yield will also be treated as a periodic payment, if the
payments would otherwise qualify as periodic. Mahana v. United States, supra note
12; Jane C. Grant, supra note 48. However, the payment of a lump sum to discharge
a husband's obligation to make periodic payments is not a deductible amount. Frank J.
Loverin, supra note 45.
50. Lily R. Reighley, supra note 15; accord, Antoinette C. Holahan, supra note
42 (Immaterial that part of arrearages arose prior to 1942 and during the period in
which the wife was not taxable on alimony payments.)
A different rule applies to payments received from an estate or trust. Ibid. See
note 15 supra.
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Where a payment is not to be made at regular intervals, or in
a lump sum, the Tax Court has tended to turn to the explicit defini-
tion of the "installment" payment in section 22(k). Thereby, it
has defined "periodic" in a negative way by stating that all pay-
ments, other than installment payments as defined in the section
"are to be considered as periodic payments." '51 Thus, the statu-
tory definition may serve the dual purpose of defining both the
installment and the periodic payment.
Section 22(k) defines an installment payment as one "dis-
charging a part of an obligation the principal sum of which is . . .
specified in the decree or instrument" incident thereto.
52 The
term "principal sum" refers to a specified or ascertainable amount
set forth in a decree or settlement agreement as representing in
terms of money or property the husband's entire obligation to sup-
port the wife which has arisen by virtue of the termination of the
full marital relation.58
Section 22(k) contains an exception to the general rule that
an installment payment is not taxable to the wife. It provides that
an installment payment will be treated as a periodic payment "if
such principal sum, by the terms of the decree or instrument, may
be or is to be paid within a period ending more than 10 years from
51. John H. Lee, 10 T. C. 834 (1948) Acq., 1948-2 Cum. BULL. 3.
The Service has taken the position that "Payments to be made for a definite period
of time are considered to be 'installment payments' and not 'periodic payments' within
the meaning of section 22(k) of the Code." I. T. 3944, 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 56. In
the Lee case the Tax Court in effect has refused to accept this view by rejecting the
argument made by the petitioner therein that "there must be uncertainty as to the
total amount to be paid and indefiniteness as to the length of the period during which
the payments are to be made, in order that the payments may be classified as 'periodic'
and conversely, the two requisites of 'installment payments' are certainty as to the
amount and definiteness as to the period." But see Herbert v. Riddell, 103 F. Supp.
369 (S. D. Cal. 1952).
It would appear more accurate to conclude that payments to be made for a definite
period of time result in installment payments only if the definite period of time is
10 years or less.
52. Section 71(c) (1) of the proposed Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides:
"(c) Principal Sum Paid in Installments.-
(1) General Rule:-For purposes of subsection (a), installment pay-
ments discharging a part of an obligation the principal sum of which
is, either in terms of money or property, specified in the decree,
instrument, or agreement shall not be treated as periodic payments."
53. In Elsie B. Gale, 13 T. C. 661, 666 (1949), aff'd, Gale v. Commissioner, 191
F. 2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951), the Court defined "principal sum" as follows: "The term'principal sum' as used in section 22(k) contemplates a fixed and specified sum of
money or property payable to the wife in complete or partial discharge of the husband's
obligation to provide for his wife's support or maintenance . . .
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the date of such decree or instrument . . . (Emphasis added).
In such cases "the installment payment is considered a periodic
payment," but then "only to the extent that the installment pay-
ment, or sum of the installment payments, received during the
wife's taxable year does not exceed 10 per cent of the principal
sum.' '5 The remainder of the payment retains its character as an
installment payment and is not deductible by the husband."' How-
ever, this 10 per cent limitation "applies to installment payments
made in advance but does not apply to delinquent installment pay-
ments for a prior taxable year of the wife made during her taxable
year."
57
The "installment payment" which does not fit within the
statutory exception has two characteristics: (1) the period be-
tween the effective date of the decree or instrument and the date
on which the last payment may be made is 10 years or less, and
(2) a "principal sum" is "specified" in the decree or instrument
incident to the decree.
54. Section 71(c) (2) of the proposed Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides:
"(c) I rincipal Sum Paid in Installments.-
(2) Where period for payment is more than 10 years.-If, by the terms
of the decree, instrument, or agreement, the principal sum referred
to in paragraph (1) is to be paid or may be paid over a period end-
ing more than 10 years from the date of such decree, instrument,
or agreement, then (notwithstanding paragraph (I)) the installment
payments shall be treated as periodic payments for purposes of sub-
section (a), but (in the case of any one taxable year of the wife)
only to the extent of 10 percent of the principal sum. For purposes
of the preceding sentence, the part of any principal sum which is
allocable to a period after the taxable year of the wife in which
it is received shall be treated as an installment payment for the
taxable year in which it is received."
55. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(k) -1- (c); see James M. Fidler, supra note 39.
56. The Regulations give the following example of the application of the ten per
cent limitation.
"Example (2). A divorce decree in 1952 provides that H is to pay W $20,000
each year for the next five years . . . and then $5,000 each year for the next
ten years. Assuming the wife makcs her returns on the calendar year basis,
each payment received in the years 1952-1956, inclusive, is a periodic pay-
ment . . ., but only to the extent of 10 per cent of the principal sum of
$150,000. Thus, for such taxable years, only $15,000 of the $20,000 received
is includible under section 22(k) in the wife's income and is deductible
by the husband under section 23(u). For the years 1957-1966, inclusive, the
full $5,000 received each year is includible in her income and is deductible
from the husband's income." U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(k) -1- (c) (2).
It should be noted that the total of $25,000, which was non-deductible during the first
five years, may not be "carried forward" and be deducted during the later years when,
due to the reduction in payment, a full ten per cent deduction is not taken.
See Barbara B. LeMond, 13 T. C. 670 (1949) Acq., 1952-1 CuLt. BULL. 3, a case in-
volving the application of this ten per cent limitation by the Tax Court to an initial
lump sum payment, followed by three monthly periodic payments, followed in turn by
the first payment on a lump sum obligation payable in a period of over ten years, all
of which was received in one taxable year.
57. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, §3922(k)-1-(c) (1).
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Ordinarily, the 10 year requirement is easily applied. For
example, the payment of a principal sum in quarterly amounts
upon the happening of a contingency"8 or made annually over a
four year period59 have been found not deductible as installment
payments. The ten year period runs "from the date of such decree
or instrument"6 and the effective date of the decree or instru-
ment depends upon the law of the state of the action."
It is not necessary, however, that a decree or agreement ex-
pressly set forth the period during which payment is to be made.
Where a husband is obligated to pay a specified principal sum at a
named amount per week or month, the Court will determine the
period of payment by dividing the amount of each payment into
the principal sum.62 If the period of time between the effective
date of the decree or instrument and the date on which the last
payment may be made is 10 years or less, the payments are non-
deductible, since both elements of the installment payment-a
principal sum and a period of 10 years or less-are present or at
least ascertainable.6"
The second characteristic of the installment payment is the
specification of a principal sum in the decree or instrument. Al-
though the section speaks in terms of a sum "specified", the Tax
Court has found no material difference between a decree or in-
strument in which the principal sum is actually specified, and
one from which it is possible to construct a principal sum, as of the
58. Jean Cattier, supra note 40.
59. Edward Bartsch, 18 T. C. 65 (1952), aff'd, Bartsch v. Commissioner, 203 F.
2d 715 (2d Cir. 1953) ; accord, E. L. Westhafer, 12 T. C. M. 1100 (1953) (Decree issued
January 2, 1945, awarding alimony in the amount of $12,000 to be payable $100 per
month beginning on January 5, 1945. Held: non-deductible installment payments since
the last payment would be made less than ten years from the date of the decree);
Reis v. United States, 54-1 U. S. T. C. 9206 (D. Kan. 1953) (Decree dated March 24,
1947, and monthly payments of $300 ordered to begin on April 1, 1947, until amount of
$36,000 was paid. Held: payments deductible, since last payment could be made up
to and including March 31, 1957, which was more than 10 years from the date of the
decree.) ; Ned Fuller, supra note 20; James M. Fidler, supra note 39. See U. S. Treas.
Reg. 118, § 39.22(k) -1- (c) (2), Example (1) : "Under the terms of a divorce decree,
11 is to pay W a gross sum of $100,000 in four annual installments. No part of the
$100,000 is includible in W's income under section 22(k) nor deductible by H."
60. INT. REv. CODE, § 22(k).
61. Thus, by virtue of the provisions of the law of Illinois, a decree became
effective on the date it was signed by the judge, rather than on the date it was en-
rolled or entered by the clerk. Blum v. Commissioner, 177 F. 2d 670 (7th Cir. 1949),
reversing, Harry Blum, 7 T. C. M. 798 (1948.) See Reis v. United States, supra note 59.
62. J. B. Steinel, 10 T. C. 409 (1948) ; Lemuel Alexander Carmichael, 14 T. C.
1356 (1950) Acq., 1910-2 Cum BULL. 1; Frank R. Casey, supra note 17; Mary Louise
Williams, 12 T. C. M. 1194 (1953).
63. Ibid.
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time the decree is entered, by elementary arithmetic processes.0 4
Consequently, where no principal sum is specified in the decree or
instrument, the Court will "multiply the specified weekly pay-
ments by the number of weeks over which they were to be paid to
determine the principal sum specified." According to the Court:
"There is at best only a formal difference between such a decree
and one where the total amount is expressly set out."15  This pro-
cedure has been followed in a number of cases. 6 However, the
Court has indicated that, where payments are to be made by the
husband during his life, it will not use mortality tables in order to
approximate the period of payment and thereby derive a principal
sum. 6
7
There are two limitations upon the use of simple arithmetic
to construct a principal sum where none is actually specified in the
decree or instrument. The first is inherent in the method itself.
Clearly, where the amount of the individual payments cannot be
foretold as on the date of the decree or instrument, it is im-
possible to construct a principal sum. This has occurred where
payments to the wife are geared to the husband's income and this
income is of a clearly fluctuating character. In such cases the
payments do not constitute installment payments, even though
the obligation to pay terminates within a period of 10 years or
less.
Such were the facts in the case John H. Lee."5 Here the hus-
band agreed to pay his wife one-third of his net income up to a
certain amount and one-fourth of his net income over that amount
for a period of five years. The husband's income varied due to a
bonus received by him, which was based upon the net profits of the
company of which he was president, and also presumably upon
the income from his substantial stockholdings in the company.
The Commissioner argued that the principal sum was "specified
. . .because at the end of five years the exact amount would be
known." The Tax Court rejected this argument, stating that
"eventually all uncertainties in every case will be resolved by the
passing of time." The Court held:
"The total payments to be made in the present case could not
be satisfactorily calculated in advance because there was no
64. Harold M. Fleming and Helena P. Fleming, 14 T. C. 1308 (1950); Frank
P. Orsatti Estate, 12 T. C. 188 (1949) ; Frank R. Casey, supra note 17; Herbert v.
Riddell, supra note 51; James M. Fidler, supra note 39; Rudolph B. S. Myers, 11
T. C. M. 1163 (1952); Benjamin Davidson, 11 T. C. M. 1111 (1952); Edwin T. Heath,
11 T. C. M. 482 (1952); Horace M. Read, 10 T. C. M 399 (1951). For an unusual
application of this method, see the discussion of the Fleming case, infra note 172.
65. Frank P. Orsatti Estate, supra note 64.
66. Cases cited note 64 supra.
67. John H. Lee, suPra note 51.
68. 10 T. C. 834 (1948).
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means of determining what the 'net income' of this petitioner
might be . . .
"The agreement of the parties in this case fixes no principal
sum and it was impossible to know in advance how much the
petitioner would have to pay his wife . . . These payments do
not come within the description of installment payments con-
tained in section 22(k). All other payments are to be considered
as periodic payments and taxable to the wife rather than to the
husband. The period of five years fixed by the agreement is not
sufficient, in view of the uncertainty as to the amount, to make
these payments taxable to the husband under sections 22 (k) and
23 (u) "69
The second limitation was imposed by recent decisions of the
United States Courts of Appeal for various circuits. These courts
held it improper for the Tax Court to construct a principal sum
by arithmetic means where the husband's obligation to pay would
terminate under the terms of the decree or instrument upon the
death of the husband or wife or upon the remarriage of the wife.70
Prior to these decisions the Tax Court had held the mere presence
of such contingencies did not preclude the construction of a prin-
cipal sum in a particular taxable year, so long as a contingency
in fact had not arisen and avoided the obligation during the year.7
69. Similarly in Roland Keith Young, 10 T. C. 724 (1948) Acq., 1948-2 Cum. BULL.
4, the divorce decree obligated the husband to make monthly payments for a period
of fifty months of a certain percentage of his net income up to a certain maximum
annual payment. The husband, an actor, was able to show wide fluctuations in his
annual income. The Court held the payments were not installment payments, because
"it would not have been possible at the time the decree was entered to compute a
lump sum or total sum to be paid . . ." Both the Lee and Young cases, the Court
has stated, "must be regarded as resting upon the special facts presented therein."
Janmes M. Fidler, supra note 39.
70. Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F. 2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953), reversing in part, F.
Ellsworth Baker, 17 T. C. 1610 (1952); Smith v. Commissioner, 208 F. 2d 349 (3d
Cir. 1953), reversing in part, Estate of Frank C. Smith, 11 T. C. M. 1167 (1952).
71. In contrast to the decisions by the Courts of Appeal, the Tax Court decisions
did not turn on whether the statute required an amount of the fairly definite character
and one with no suggestion of uncertainty. Instead, the issue presented by the peti-
tioner and decided by the Court was whether, in view of the contingencies, an "obli-
gation", part of which was discharged by the payment, existed within the meaning of
the statute. In a number of cases the Tax Court held that it did. Frank P. Orsatti
Estate, supra note 64; J. B. Steinel, supra note 62; see James M. Fidler, sipra note 39.
See Rudolph B. S. Myers, supra note 64. According to the Court in the Steinel case:
'We are of the opinion that the word 'obligation' is used in section 22(k)
in its general sense and includes obligations subject to contingencies where
those contingencies have not arisen and have not avoided the obligation during
the taxable years. Stated conversely, we are of the opinion that the word
'obligation' is not used in section 22(k) to mean only an absolute and un-
conditional obligation . . ." (10 T. C. at 412).
Although the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Baker case was not based on
the meaning of the word "obligation", but rather, it appears, more upon the word
"specified", nonetheless it has the effect of overruling the Court's definition of that
word to the extent it applied to constructed installment payments subject to the named
contingencies.
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The case Baker v. Commissioner72 was the first to overrule the
decisions of the Tax Court. In this ease a separation agreement
obligated the husband to pay certain monthly amounts to the wife
for a period of six years, provided that during this period the
wife did not die or remarry. Upon the occurrence of either con-
tingency the husband's obligation would terminate. Multiplying
the monthly payment by the period of payment in order to obtain
a principal sum, the Tax Court had found the payments to be
installment payments and accordingly not deductible by the hus-
band.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed the holding on this point. It stated that the Tax Court's
method of obtaining a principal sum might be sound were there
no contingencies which might prematurely terminate the husband's
obligation. However, the Court said, ". . . the language of the
statute before us in the instant case--'the principal sum
specified in the decree'--clearly implies an amount of a fairly
definite character, and thus carries with it no such suggestion of
uncertainty." Where the contingency of remarriage existed, as
here, it held the Tax Court's method of supplying the principal
sum by arithmetic was too uncertain, since the possibility of a
divorced wife's remarriage was "fax beyond the reach of an
educated guess."
The Baker decision was based primarily upon the effect of
the contingency of the wife's remarriage. The Court indicated
that resort might be had to actuarial tables if the only contingency
had been the prior death of the wife. It refused, however, to use
actuarial tables "relating to the chances of the continued celibacy
of widows", because, it noted, "a divorced wife's remarriage . . .
depends upon some elements of her own seemingly unpredictable
choosing . . ."
In a later decision, Smith v. Commissioner," the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit broadened the Baker rule by a
finding that other contingencies would preclude the construction of
a principal sum. It narrowed the rationale of the Baker rule,
however, by refusing to permit the presence of contingencies to
alter the character of payments where a principal sum actually
had been specified. In the Smith case the husband agreed to pay
his wife $25,000 in ten equal semi-annual installments, and, in addi-
tion, the amount of $300 a month for five years and $100 a month
thereafter. The agreement also provided that the obligation to
pay would terminate upon the happening of any one of three
72. See note 70 supra.
73. Ibid.
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contingencies: the death of the husband, the death of the wife or
the remarriage of the wife. During the taxable year in question
the husband had made both semi-annual payments and monthly
payments of $300 per month.
The Tax Court disallowed the claim of the husband for a de-
duction of both the monthly and the semi-annual payments on the
ground that both constituted installment payments. With respect
to the monthly payments, the Court treated the duty to pay $300
a month for five years and $100 a month thereafter as separate
and severable obligations, rather than as a single obligation to
pay varying amounts at different times. Instead, it multiplied the
$300 monthly payments by the five year period of payment to
obtain a principal sum. The Tax Court did not determine the tax
consequences of the $100 payments, because payments of this
amount had not been made during the period in issue. The obliga-
tion to pay the principal sum of $25,000 in ten equal semi-annual
payments, it found, clearly called for installment payments, since
both elements of this type of payment were present.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, relying on the Baker de-
cision, reversed the Tax Court in part in holding that the husband
was entitled to deduct the monthly payments but not the semi-
annual payments. The Court stated that since the obligation to
make monthly payments was subject to three contingencies. the
occurrence of any one of which would have relieved the husband
of his obligation, "the promise to pay was not . . . one which
could be mathematically calculated as a certain obligation of th
husband."174 It affirmed the Tax Court's decision that the semi-
annual payments constituted non-deductible installment payments
under the statute, for the agreement literally had specified a prin-
cipal sum to be discharged by these payments. According to the
Court: "The Baker case is important . . .But we find nothing in
it to change what seems to us an obvious installment payment
under this contract to a 'periodic' payment."
The Smith case both broadened and narrowed the rule of the
Baker case. Whereas the Baker decision recognized the con-
tingency of the wife's remarriage as sufficient to deny the use of
mathematics to construct a principal sum, the Court indicated
that the contingency of the wife's death per se might not be suffi-
cient since resort could be had to actuarial tables. The Smith
74. Ibid. In a concurring opinion a different and far more desirable theory was
advanced for holding the monthly payments deductible. Instead of viewing the monthly
payments for five years "as an isolated undertaking," Judge -lastie would treat these
payments and those of a lesser amount thereafter as a single obligation. In this way
the monthly payments would be periodic within the meaning of the statute and it would
be unnecessary to reach the problem of the Baker case.
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decision appears not only to recognize this latter contingency
as sufficient to preclude the construction of a principal sum, but it
also added the contingency of the death of the husband would
require the same result. The Smitk decision was narrower than
the Baker case to the extent that it declined to extend the rationale
of that case to an agreement in which a principal sum was specified.
Thus, where an agreement or decree literally specifies a principal
sum and payment over a period of ten years or less, the install-
ment payment provisions of section 22(k) apply, regardless of the
existence of any or all of three named contingencies. Despite the
unfavorable decision in the Baker case the Tax Court has ex-
pressed its intention to "continue to adhere" to its previous
rule."5 Consequently, the ultimate validity and application of the
theory of the Baker case will depend upon future decisions of other
Courts of Appeal or of the United States Supreme Court.
Divorce settlements and decrees commonly provide for a lump
sum initial payment to the wife at the time of divorce or legal
separation and for regular or recurring payments for her current
support thereafter. If the payments are considered as separate
obligations, the initial payment clearly would be a non-deductible
installment payment, whereas the later support payments would
be periodic. In this type of case the argument has been made
that the two types of payments have a "unitary" nature and
must be considered as a single obligation in applying section
22(k). Since payments may be periodic, even though unequal in
amount,76 it is argued that the initial payment is merely the first,
albeit outsized, payment in a series of periodic payments. At-
tempts to urge this "unitary" theory have proved uniformly un-
successful, for the Court has stated that its acceptance "would
clearly defeat the statutory intent.' '17 According to the Court in
one case:
"We consider it reasonable to believe that Congress had such
a practice in mind and did not intend to make the wife taxable
upon the lump sum, original, or principal payment to be made
75. James M. Fidler, 20 T. C. - No. 149 (1953).
76. See Ralph Norton, supra note 40. But see the treatment of the monthly pay-
ments in the Smith case, supra note 74.
77. Ralph Norton, supra note 405 Arthur B. Baer, supra note 40; William M.
Haag, supra note 45; Edward Bartsch, supra note 59; see Joseph D. Fox, supra note
27; Barbara B. LeMond, supra note 56; Lemuel Alexander Carmichael, supra note 62.
The case of F. Ewing Glasgow, 21 T. C. - Nb. 25 (1953) Acq., I. R. B. 1954-12,
3, involved an out of the ordinary type of initial lump sum payment. The parties entered
into a settlement on December 22, 1947, and the husband agreed to pay the wife $12,500
upon the granting of a divorce decree and $3,000 per year, beginning on January 15, 1949,
thereafter. The Court found that the $12,500 payment was composed of three items:
$3,000 to support the wife in the year 1948, $2,500 for the wife's attorney's fees, and
$7,000 for medical services for the wife. It held the $3,000 payment for support to be
deductible as "one of the series of admitted periodic payments" and the remainder to be
not deductible by the husband.
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here, but that it was something in the nature of division of
capital, rather than from the husband's income so as to be de-
ductible by him."
78
The Court also has refused to unitize an obligation under which
the husband agreed to pay a certain amount over a period of less
than 10 years and a different amount for an indefinite period
thereafter. 9
Ordinarily the "payment" to be made periodically is paid
directly by the husband to the wife. In cases involving the in-
clusion of payments into the income of the wife, the Tax Court
has drawn no distinction between such payments and payments
made by a third person for the benefit of the husband. Thus,
the wife has been taxed upon payments made to her by a surety
of the husband pursuant to a contract guaranteeing payments in
a settlement agreement80 and upon payments by a corporation, of
which the husband had been an officer, in discharge of the hus-
band's obligation."'
The payment may take the form of money, 2 property,' or be
"attributable to property transferred (in trust or otherwise)." 4
In connection with the latter form of payment, the Regulations
provide that:
". . . it matters not that such payments are attributable to
property in trust, to life insurance, endowment, or annuity con-
tracts, or to any other interest in property, or are paid directly
or indirectly by the obligor husband from his income or
capital."8 5
78. Ralph N.orton, supra note 40.
79. See treatment of monthly payments in Estate of Frank C. Smith, supra note
70. See also Edward Bartsch, supra note 59. But see notes 56 and 74 supra.
80. Luckenbach v. Pedrick, 116 F. Supp. 268 (S. D. N. Y. 1953).
81. Marcia P. Pearson, 21 T. C. - No. 93 (1954).
82. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.22(k)-i-(a) (4), examples (1) and (2).
83. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118. §39.22(k)-1-(); Pappenheimer v. Allen. supra note
45 (". . . a payment may be made in property . . .").
Where property is transferred in partial or full discharge of the husband's obli-
gation, the husband may realize a taxable capital gain on the transaction. Assume
in such a case that the husband releases to the wife his interest in a jointly held house
with a fair market value of $25,000 and a cost basis of $10,000. The husband would
realize a capital gain of $7,500.
84. INT. Rar. CODE, §22(k).
85. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 3922(k)-l-(b) (1). The Regulations also provide
examples of the type of payments intended to qualify under this language:
"For example, if in order to meet an alimony obligation of $500 a month,
the husband purchases or assigns for the benefit of his former wife a com-
mercial annuity contract paying such amount, the full $500 a month received
by the wife is includible in her income, and no part of such amount is in-
cludible in the husband's income or deductible by him . . . Likewise, if prop-
erty is transferred by the husband, subject to an annual charge of $5,000,
payable to his former wife in discharge of his alimony obligation under
the divorce decree, the $5000 received annually is . . . includible in the
wife's income, regardless of whether such amount is paid out of income
or principal of the property."
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Section 22(k) also provides that "such amounts received as are
attributable to property so transferred shall not be includible in
the gross income of such husband."18
The Court has stated that payments need not be equal in
amount.87 The amount may vary from period to period.8" Thus,
an agreement may properly provide that monthly payments shall
increase or decrease, depending on the proportion between a cer-
tain sum and the retail cost of living on a certain date and the
retail cost of living a month later 0 or that, in the event the hus-
band's salary should decrease, there should be a proportionate
decrease in the amount of the payments 0  In addition, separation
agreements may provide that payments shall cease upon the
death or'remarriage of the wife.91
A payment need not be made directly to the wife, so long as it
is applied for her benefit. The Tax Court has found such payments
"constructively received" by the wife."2  It has allowed the deduc-
tion of payments by a husband to the wife's mother in discharge
of the wife's obligation to support her, and stated by way of
dictum that payments "to a landlord, grocer, or the like" by the
husband on behalf of the wife would also qualify.9
By a similar line of reasoning, and under certain circum-
stances, the payment of premiums on a life insurance policy in
which the husband is the insured and the wife is beneficiary, may
also be "constructively received" by the wife. Deductibility de-
86. INT. REv. CODE, §22(k). See U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(k)-l-(b) (1),
supra note 85. The treatment accorded such amounts differs from payments made
from the husband's salary, for example. In the latter situation the amount of the
payment would be included in the husband's gross income. Depending on the amount
involved, however, the husband might find it more desirable in terms of tax to waive
his right to itemize this and other miscellaneous deductions and instead to take the
standard ten per cent deduction or to use the optional tax table. On the other hand,
where the payment is attributable to property, by virtue of the language quoted in
the text, the amount of it need not be included in the husband's gross income and the
husband is still free to take the standard deduction, use the optional tax-table or
itemize his deductions, as he chooses.
Section 71(d) of the proposed Internal Revenue Code of-1954 provides:
"(d) Rule for Husband in Case of Transferred Property.-The husband's
gross income does not include amounts received which, under subsec-
tion (a), are (1) includible in the gross income of the wife, and (2)
attributable to transferred property."
87. Ralph Norton,, mira note 40.
88. But see supra pp. 198 and 199. See also notes 56 and 79.
89. George T. Brady, supra note 42.
90. Bertram G. Zilmer, supra note 42; James M. Fidler, rupra note 39.
91. See text supra pp. 195 to 198, inclusive.
92. Robert Lehman, 17 T. C. 652 (1951) Acq. in part, Nonacq. in part, 1952-1
Ctim. BULL. 3, 5. The Commissioner defines "constructive receipt" in the broad sense
in U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, sec. 39.42-2. In addition, "constructive payment" by a third
person on behalf of the husband satisfies the section. See page 199, Supra.
93. Robert Lehman, supra note 92.
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pends upon whether the wife either actually or constructively re-
ceived the amounts paid as premiums or realized an ascertainabls
economic gain by virtue of the payments. At the one extreme, it
is well settled that, where the policies merely constitute collateral
security to safeguard against the possibility of the husband's death
before performance of his obligation to pay under a settlement
agreement, premiums paid are non-deductible by the husband. 4 In
such a case it has been said the amount of the premiums are not
constructively received by the wife95 and that such" security for the
faithful performance of the taxpayer's continuing obligation does
not of itself give the divorced wife more than was provided for her
in the agreement." 96 The same result follows where the policy is
"not assigned to the wife and with respect to which she is only the
contingent beneficiary.19 7 At the other extreme, both the Com-
missioner and the Courts agree that "premiums paid by the hus-
band on the life insurance policy absolutely assigned to his
former wife and with respect to which she is irrevocable beneficiary
are includible in the gross income of the wife . . .and deductible
by the husband. "'
Between these extremes cases have tended to involve insur-
ance policies in which the interest of the wife might be diminished
or defeated upon the occurrence of certain named contingencies.
Such a case was Edna Horn Seligmann.99  Here the husband
agreed to pay premiums during his life on policies transferred to
a trustee to be held for the benefit of the petitioner and her chil-
dren. A settlement agreement provided that, upon the husband's
death, the wife should receive the income or proceeds of the
policies. The interest of the wife in the policies was subject to
two contingencies. If the wife remarried, the income or the pro-
ceeds were to be paid in equal parts to the wife and children. In
the event the wife predeceased the husband, the proceeds were to
be divided between the children. Upon these facts the Tax Court
found the amount of the premiums constituted taxable income
to the wife.
94. F. Ellsworth Baker, supra note 70. (Wife designated irrevocable beneficiary
and policies delivered to her. After all payments had been made, the policies were
to be returned to the husband and the right to change beneficiaries was to be restored
to him.) ; accord, Lilian Bond Smith, 21 T. C. - No. 40 (1953) ; Halsey H7. Taylor,
16 T. C. 376 (1951) Nonacq., 1951-2 Cum. BuLL. 6; William J. Gardner, 14 T. C.
1445 (1950) aff'd, Gardner v. Commissioner, 191 F. 2d 557 (6th Cir. 1951); Lemuel
Alexander.Carmichael, supra note 62; Meyer Blumenthal, 13 T. C. 28 (1949), aff'd,
Bluineilthal v. Commissioner, 183 F. 2d 15 (3d Cir. 1950). See note 102 in fra.
95. Lemuel Alexander Carmichael, supra note 62.
96. F. Ellsworth Baker, supra note 70.
97. I. T. 4001. 1950-1 Cum. BuLl. 27.
98. Ibid.; accord, Anita Quimby Stewart, 9 T. C. 195 (1947)- Acq., 1947-2 Cut.
BuLL. 4. See the Court's treatment of the $5,000 policy in which the wife was bene-
.ficiary in Lemuel Alexander Carmichael, suPra note 62.
99. 11 T. C. M. 1170 (1952).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
versed, holding that the presence of these contingencies precluded
the treatment of these payments as income of the wife.100 The Court
did not limit its inquiry solely to the constructive receipt theory.
It stated that the issue in the case was whether the wife "in the
taxable years in question received cash, either actually or con-
structively, or property of ascertainable value." The Court held
that cash was not received, either actually or constructively, nor,
under the facts of the case, had the wife received property of
ascertainable value. It stated that:
. .. whatever right she had or acquired was dependent upon
so many contingencies that its value could not be measured
or ascertained during the taxable year . . . Under the terms of
the agreement she never could receive one cent unless she lived
longer than her husband, and even then the amount of or the
extent of the benefit would depend upon whether she was re-
married."
The only benefit received, the Court concluded, was mere peace
of mind from knowledge that protection might be of benefit in
the future, but this did "not constitute taxable economic gain."
01
Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
extended the rule of the Seligmann case by holding that the single
contingency in the settlement agreement that the wife survive the
husband was sufficient per se to preclude deduction of the pay-
ments by the husband.
10 2
Ill. An "Obligation" Growing out of the "Marital or Family
Relationship"
Undoubtedly due to the clarity of the expressions of congres-
sional intent and the Regulations, few cases have involved the re-
100. Seligmann v. Commissioner, 207 F. 2d 489 (7th Cir. 1953); accord, Lilian
Bond Smith, supra note 94; Willard H. Carr, 13 T. C. M. 138 (1954).
101. The Tax Court previously had permitted the husband to deduct the amount
of the payments upon these policies. Leon Mandel, supra note 20. Since the payments
were not taxable income to the wife, no tax whatsoever was paid on the amount of
the premiums.
102. Estate of F. C. Smith v. Commissioner, supra note 70. Accord, Raoul Walsh,
21 T. C. - No. 120 (1954). The Smith decision appears to rest on the theory
that the presence of the contingency indicated that the policies were a mere security
device. The agreement provided that "in the event the wife should die before the
husband, then, all her interest in said policies shall cease." The Court stated this"very important contingency" was enough to preclude deduction "of the payment,"
citing Blumenthal v. Commissioner, supra note 94. In the Blumenthal case the
decree of Court, adopting substantially the provisions of the settlement agreement
between the parties, provided that the wife was "entitled to be named in said life
insurance policies as irrevocable beneficiary for her life or until her remarriage" for
"the purpose of securing and protecting the plaintiff in the payments to be made."
The Court of Appeals found the premiums non-deductible, since the policies were only
a security device and gave the wife no more than that to which she was already
entitled.
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quirement that the obligation be imposed upon or incurred by the
husband "because of the marital or family relationship." The
Committee Reports indicate the intended meaning of this re-
quirement.
"This section applies only where the legal obligation being
discharged arises out of the family or marital relationship in
recognition of the general obligation to support, which is made
specific by the instrument or decree. This section does not apply
to that part of any periodic payment attributable to any interest
in the property so transferred, which interest originally belonged
to the wife, unless she received it from her husband in contem-
plation of or as an incident to the divorce or separation without
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth,
other than the release of the husband or his property from mari-
tal obligations." 08
As an example of the type of payments excluded, the Regula-
tions provide that the section shall not apply to
,. . . that part of any periodic payment which is attributable
to the repayment by the husband of . . . a bona fide loan pre-
viously made to him by the wife, the satisfaction of which is
specified in the divorce decree as a part of the general settle-
ment between the husband and wife."104
In those few cases which have arisen, the issue has been a
factual one, involving .the application of the facts of the case to
the principles quoted. The Tax Court has held that amounts
attributable to the repayment of a loan 05 or attributable to the
purchase of property by the husband from the wife'06 do not satisfy
this requirement of the section. It has also indicated that pay-
ments made by the husband upon the purchase price of a wife's
interest in their business did not arise from the marital or family
relationship in recognition of the obligation to support the wife.
0 7
103. H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1942), 1942-2 Cum. BULL.
372; SE-N. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 504. The first
sentence of this quotation appears almost verbatim in the regulations. U. S. Treas.
Reg. 118, §39.22(k)-l-(a) (5). It will be noted that, in specifying the basis for the
obligation, the language of the statute ("because of the marital or family relationship")
is broader than that in the congressional reports ("where the legal obligation . . .
arises out of the family or marital relationship in recognition of the general obligation
to support"). (Emphasis added).
104. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, §3922(k)-l-(a) (5).
105. A lfons B. Landa, 11 T. C. M. 420 (1952), remanded, Landa v. Commissioner,
206 F. 2d 431 (C. A. D. C. 1953) The Court of Appeals remanded so that the Tax
Court might consider certain oral testimony previously disregarded by the Court
which purported to show that these payments were in the nature of alimony.
106. Frank J. DuBane, supra note 20.
107. Donald B. Semrple, 10 T. C. M. 795 (1951). See Julia Nathan, 19 T. C. 865
(1953). In the Nathan case a similar contention was made by the wife, but the wife
failed to meet the burden of disproving the Commissioner's determination that the
payments had arisen "because of the marital or family relationship", and consequently
the payments were taxable to the wife.
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The mere division of community property does not qualify under
this requirement of the section.108
Along these lines, payments made to the wife to prevent an
attack upon a divorce decree obtained in another state by the
husband were found to have been incurred only because the
husband "wished to sustain his divorced status". 1 9 Similarly,
payments made under a later agreement rescinding a prior one
were found not to qualify, because the payments constituted con-
sideration for the release by the wife of the custody of children
of the parties to the husband.10
Section 22(k) further provides that payment must be made
pursuant to an "obligation" imposed upon the husband by a de-
cree or incurred by him in a written instrument. The "word 'ob-
ligation' is not used in section 22(k) to mean only an absolute
and unconditional obligation . . . "; it "includes obligations sub-
ject to contingencies where those contingencies have not arisen
and have not avoided the obligation during the taxable year.""'
Nonetheless a binding obligation must be shown. No obligation
exists within the meaning of the section where the agreement
contains provision for reducing the amount payable and gives
the husband an absolute right of revocation."2 A purely voluntary
payment does not qualify as one pursuant to a legal obligation.
Consequently, where a husband is under no duty to make payments
but does so," 3 or where the husband voluntarily increases the
amount he is obligated to pay,' the amount of the payment or of
the increase is not deductible. Payments must be made under the
compulsion of a decree or instrument and in an amount not greater
than that specified therein in order to qualify.1
Although section 22(k) speaks in terms of a "legal" obliga-
tion, it is not necessary that the decree or instrument under which
the obligation arose be valid in the state of marital domicile in
order to satisfy the statute. Congress clearly intended to free the
108. Thomas E. Hogg. 13 T. C. 361 (1949) Nonacq., 1950-1 Cum. BuLu. 7;
Floyd H. Brown, 16 T. C. 623 (1951) Acq., 1951-2 Cum. BuuL. 2. See U. S. Treas.
Reg. 118, §39.22(k)-1-(b) (3).
109. Benjamin B. Cox, 10 T. C. 955 (1948), aff'd, Cox v. Commissioner, 176 F.
2d 226 (3d Cir. 1949). See W. L. H. Bergen, supra note 34.
110. Newton v. Pedrick, 115 F. Supp. 368 (S. D. N. Y. 1953).
111. J. B. Stcinel, supra note 62. Here the Court rejected the argument that
payments had not been made pursuant to an "obligation", because the duty to pay
terminated if the wife died or remarried. Accord, Frank P. Orsatti Estate, sepra note 64;
Harold M. Fleming and Helena P. Fleming, supra note 64; James M. Fidler, supra note
39. But see supra pp. 195 to 198, inclusive.
112. Dale E. Sharp, 15 T. C. 185 (1950).
113. Ibid.; see Emanuel Albomn, 10 T. C. M. 300 (1951).
114. Frederick S. Dauwalter, supra note 21; Peter Van Vlaanderen, 10 T. C.




provisions of the section from the uncertainty and lack of uni-
formity of state law.
In addition, the amended sections will produce uniformity in
the treatment of amounts paid in the nature of and in lieu
of alimony regardless of variance in the laws of different
States concerning the existence and continuance of an obligation
to pay alimony."'116 (Emphasis added)
Both the Commissioner and the courts agree that a decree
need not necessarily be valid in the state of marital domicile. The
Commissioner has ruled it to be "within the general intent of Con-
gress" to permit the deduction of payments made pursuant to a
Mexican decree, even though it seemed "probable that such a
decree would not be recognized" in the state of domicile." 7 Later,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Feinberg v. Com-
mnissioner"8 adopted and extended the ruling to a case in which
a state court actually had refused to recognize the validity of the
decree of another state. Here, parties domiciled in New York
entered into a separation agreement and the husband thereafter
obtained a divorce in Florida. The wife did not appear in the
action, nor did counsel appear on her behalf. Service had been
by publication. Although a New York State court later declared
the wife to be the husband's true and lawful wife, the Court of
Appeals permitted the deduction of payments made pursuant to
the Florida decree, stating that:
"The mere fact that the marital domicile of the parties did
not recognize the Florida divorce does not render it a nullity
for Federal income tax purposes.'
The majority of the cases bearing upon this question have
involved an obligation to pay incurred by the husband under a
settlement agreement. Here, too, the argument has been made
that an agreement did not constitute a "legal" obligation, because
for some reason it violated state public policy or state law. The
Tax Court has said that such arguments not only misinterpret the
term "legal obligation", but, in any event, must be rejected due
to the expressed congressional intent to produce uniformity in the
tax treatment of payments in the nature of alimony regardless of
the variances in state law.
Charles Campbel" 9 was such a ease. The case is significant
not merely because of its treatment of the precise issue presented,
116. H. P. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1942), 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 372,
427; SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 1942-2 Cum. BLL. 504, 568.
117. G. C. M. 25250, 1947-2 Cum. BULL. 32.
118. 198 F. 2d 260 (3d Cir. 1952).
119. 15 T. C. 355 (1950) Acq., 1951-1 Cum. BULL. 1.
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but particularly because it contains one of the few expressions by
th6 Court of the meaning of the term "legal obligation". Here
the Commissioner contended that a settlement agreement was void
under Section 51 of New York Domestic Relations Law and the
public policy of the state because it had a direct tendency toward
dissolving the marriage. Accordingly, it was argued in brief, that
the petitioner had not incurred a "legal obligation". The Court
rejected this argument in the following language:
"We do not agree with respondents contention. He errs
first of all in his interpretation of section 22(k). Congress
was not directing its attention to a legal obligation under a
written instrument in enacting that section of the Code, but to
a legal obligation which arises out of the martial or family re-
lationship. In H. Rept., No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., page
72, it is stated:
* This section applies only where the legal obligation be-
ing discharged arises out of the family or martial rela-
tionship in recognition of the general obligation to sup-
port, which is made specific by the decree or instru-
ment.***
In S. Rept. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., page 83, there is
similar language. The instrument here involved embodied the
discharge of a legal obligation which arose out of the family or
marital relationship and for that reason is one intended by sec-
tion 22(k) of the Code"'120
The Court stated that there was still another reason for hold-
ing that the Commissioner misinterpreted section 22(k): the clear
congressional purpose of producing uniformity in the tax treat-
ment of payments in the nature of alimony, regardless of state law.
It said:
"We believe that to sustain respondent's contention in this
instance would do much to violate the expressed purpose of pro-
ducing uniformity in the tax treatments of amounts paid re-
gardless of variance of laws among the states. There could well
be some variance among the states under their respective codes
and the law of decided cases concerning the interpretation of
written instruments such as the one here in question." 121
In accordance with the congressional intent, the Tax Court
has found that payments made, after an absolute divorce under
an agreement executed prior to issuance of the divorce decree,
satisfied the section, even though state law did not allow alimony
120. Id. at 359.
121. Id. at 360.
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to a spouse who received an absolute divorce. 22 In addition, both
the Commissioner and courts agree that, although the death of
the husband may discharge his duty to support the wife under
state law, payment by the husband's estate to the wife satisfies the
"legal obligation" requirement.
23
The language in the Committee Reports and in some cases
should not be interpreted too broadly, however. The decisions and
rulings do not mean that the Tax Court or Commissioner wili
ignore state public policy or the provisions of state law, as it
affects the decree or instrument, under all circumstances. For
instance, neither will permit the deduction of voluntary payments
made after the husband has been discharged of the duty to support
the wife by the divorce court in accordance with state law. 24
Nor will the Court or Commissioner ignore the need for payment
under a decree or instrument incident thereto, despite the con-
gressional intent to produce uniformity in the tax treatment of
alimony regardless of state law concerning "the existence . . .
of an obligation" to pay.12  The decisions and ruling do mean,
however, that, although payment must be made pursuant to and
in conformity with certain types of decrees or an instrument
incident thereto, the courts are little concerned about the pro-
visions of state law concerning the technical existence or effect of
122. Tuckie G. Hesse, supra note 42; Thomas E. Hogg, supra note 110. See
Arletta C. Harris, 11 T. C. M. 895 (1952) ; Newton v. Pedrick, supra note 109. In the
Newton case the parties entered into a settlement agreement and were divorced shortly
thereafter in 1924. In 1926 the wife remarried. The original agreement was superseded
by agreements in 1928 and 1930. One issue was whether the husband was obligated
to support the wife in 1930, apparently in view of her remarriage in 1926, prior to
execution of the 1930 agreement. The District Court said:
"I need not consider whether under New York law plaintiff was in 1930
under any legal obligation to support his former wife, for Sec. 22(k) was
designed to 'produce uniformity in tax treatment . . . regardless of variance
in state law concerning the existence and continuance of an obligation to
pay alimony.' (H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1942)." 115 F.
Supp. at 374.
Accord: Brown v. United States, 54-1 U. S. T. C. 9313 (N. D. Cal. 1954)
(Payments made after remarriage of wife qualify under the section, even though obliga-
tion to pay alimony did not survive remarriage of wife under state law.)
123. Estate of Homer Laughlin v. Commissioner, 167 F. 2d 828 (9th Cir.
1948), reversing, Estate of Homer Laughlin, 8 T. C. 33 (1947) Acq., 1947-1 Cum.
Buu.. 3. See I. T. 4108, 1952-2 Cum. BuLL. 113. In this ruling, the divorce
court in 1937 ordered the husband to make payments for the support of both the wife
and the minor child of the parties. In 1941 the wife remarried. The husband con-
tinued to make payments. In 1947 the divorce court purported to cancel the husband's
obligation to support the wife, ordered that payments should be made for the child's
support alone, and purported to give its amended decree retroactive effect. It was
ruled that payments made "to the divorced wife after her remarriage and prior to
entry of the modifying order . . . continued to come within the scope of section 22(k)"
and, on the basis of the Daine case, supra note 25, and Van Vlaanderen case, supra note
114, for tax purposes retroactive effect should not be given the modified order. But see
niote 159 infra.
124. See supra p. 204
125. See supra pp. 186 and 187.
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a present obligation upon the husband, or the continuing nature of
a prior one, as it may or may not stand under state law, so long
as a decree or agreement exists or has existed and payment has
been made pursuant to it.
IV. Legal Obligation Imposed Upon or Incurred by the Hu'-
band Under Such "Decree [of Divorce or Separate
Maintenance] or Under a Written Instrument Incident
to such Divorce or [Legal] Separation."
Section 22(k) and the proposed section 71(a) (1) require that
the husband's obligation to pay arises from one of two sources:
(1) a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, or, (2) a
written instrument incident to either such decree.
An obligation to pay, imposed by a decree of divorce or separ-
ate maintenance alone qualifies as the first source of the husband's
obligation. 26
Where the husband's obligation arises under an agreement,
or, in the broader term of the statute, an "instrument", the agree-
ment must both be "written" and it must be "incident to" one of
the two decrees specified. This latter "limitation on alimony de-
ductions was probably due to the apprehension that unless the
payments were part of or incident to some publicly recorded
action of the Court, separation agreements might be used for taxavoidance. 1 1117
In connection with the former requirement, no formal docu-
ment or formal offer or acceptance is necessary. An exchange
of correspondence between the parties will suffice. A letter by
a husband prior to the decree, making an offer to pay, which
the wife accepts by letter, satisfies this requirement. 2  It has
also been held that an offer of settlement and support by a hus-
band in a letter, which is later performed by the husband and
merely acquiesced in by the wife, constitutes a "written" instru-
ment for the purposes of the section.'29
126. See supra p. 185 et seq.
127. G. C. M. 25250, 1947-2 Cum. BuLL. 32. It has also been suggested that:
"The reason for the decree requirement seems to have been a fear that
without court approval of the amounts to be paid, excessive income-splitting
might be achieved-at a time when income-splitting between still-married
couples was not allowed." American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax
Statute 266 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1952).
In this Draft, it is stated that "it . . . seems desirable to end the requirement of a
decree", in view of the present propriety of income splitting by married couples and
the litigation provoked by the requirement that payment be made pursuant to a decree
or an instrument "incident to" a decree. Ibid. The present Congress appears to agree.
128. Charles Campbell, supra note 119.
129. Floyd W. Jefferson, 13 T. C. 1092 (1949). But see Frederick S. Dauwalter,
supra note 21, where, in informal correspondence after issuance of the decree, the husband
agreed to pay amounts additional to those specified in the settlement agreement between
them. The Court stated: " . . the informal correspondence does not constitute a'written instrument' . . ."
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An oral agreement between the husband and wife naturally
does not satisfy.3 0 No effect, will be given an oral agreement,
representing the actual intent of the parties, where a written
agreement was executed and presented to the divorce court, even
though the latter did not and was not meant to express the intention
of the parties."3 ' A written agreement, relating to custody of
children and containing a provision that "the parties have made
a verbal agreement as to the support of the [wife] . . . and said
minor children, the terms of which are not set out in [the] . . .
Agreement", has also been held not to qualify, for the written
agreement did not relate to the support of the wife and the mere
reference to the oral agreement would not thereby incorporate it
into the written agreement. 3
2
A serious difficulty has arisen in attempting to apply the
second requirement relating to an obligation incurred under an
agreement: the agreement must be "incident to" one of the
specified types of decree.
Where the instrument or agreement has been approved,
adopted or ratified by the divorce court, it is clearly incident to a
decree. 8
The construction of the words "incident to" in other con-
texts, however, has admittedly posed a "troublesome question"
for the Courts.3 4 In early decisions the Tax Court once again
attempted paraphrases,'35 but these served to confuse as much as
clarify. In the course of its later decisions, the meaning stabilized.
130. Ben Myerson, 10 T. C. 729 (1948). See Ann Y. Oliver, 8 T. C. M. 403
(1949).
131. See Frank J. DuBane, supra note 20.
132. Ben, Myerson, supra note 130.
133. Muriel Dodge Neeman, supra note 17; Francis V. DuPont v. United States.
104 Fed. Supp. 978 (Ct. Cl. 1952) ; Helen, Scott Fairbanks, supra note 12; Miller v. Com-
inissoner, 199 F. 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1952), reversing, Cecil A. Miller, 16 T. C. 1010
(1951). See Blun v. Commissioner, supra note 61; Roland Keith Young, supra note 69.
An agreement expressly incorporated by reference into a decree clearly would be incident
to the decree. Dorothy Briggs Smith, 192 F. 2d 841 (1st Cir. 1951), affirming, Smith
v. Commissioner, 16 T. C. 639 (1951). See Lilian Bond Smith, supra note 94.
The Tax Court indicated in Raoul Walsh, supra note 102, that, if a decree referred
to or approved an agreement, the agreement would not be considered as a part of the
decree unless it was enforceable under the decree. In any event, such an agreement
would be incident to the decree.
134. Lerner v. Commissioner, 195 F. 2d 296 (2d Cir. 1952), reversing, Joseph J.
Lerner, 15 T. C. 379 (1950) ; Izrastzoff v. Commissioner, 193 F. 2d 625 (2d Cir. 1952),
affirming, Estate of Daniel G. Reid, 15 T. C. 573 (1950).
135. In Israstzoff v. Commissioner. supra note 134, noting that this was a "phrase
which Courts have found difficulty in clarifying", the Court pointed out that "'incident to'
has been paraphrased as 'in connection with,' . . . 'part of the package of the divorce',
. .. 'contemplated at the time of executing the agreement' . . . [and] 'usually or natur-
ally and inseparably depends upon, appertains to, or follows'." To these one may add:
"direct relationship to the divorce". Elizabeth A. Guggenheim, supra note 42; "agree-
ment reached in anticipation of a divorce." Jessie L. Fry, 13 T. C. 658 (1949).
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An agreement could be incident to a decree even though it was
not referred to by the divorce court.18 6  However, to be incident to
a decree, a written instrument "must be part of an integral plan
of the two spouses, which [plan] includes the obtaining of a
divorce.' 7  Stated differently, -there must have been an "an-
ticipation of divorce by both parties at the time of the execution
of the agreement"'8 8 or, in other words, that "a divorce proceed-
ing was contemplated at the time of executing the agreement.1 80
The mere possibility of divorce at some unspecified time, in con-
trast to an actual, positive, present, joint intent to obtain a divorce
at the time of the execution of the agreement was not sufficient.140
The Court found this requirement clearly satisfied by an ex-
press agreement between the parties that one would immediately
seek a divorce. That the agreement and divorce, it said, "are
a part of a single plan is clear where there is an express agree-
ment or promise that'one spouse is to sue for a divorce promptly
following the agreement calling for the periodic payments. 14 1
Along the same lines, the Court found the requirement satisfied
where the agreement was placed in escrow and its operation made
contingent upon the obtaining of a divorce by one of the parties. 142
Where there was no evidence of this nature the Court none-
theless sought other evidence which indicated it had been a fore-
going conclusion between the parties at the time of the execution
of the agreement that one would obtain a divorce or, lacking this,
136. Lily R. Reighley, supra note 15; Floyd W. Jefferson, supra note 129; George
T. Brady, supra note 42; Robert Wood Johnson, 10 T. C. 647 (1948) Acq., 1948-2 Cum.
BULL. 2; Tuckie G. Hesse, supra note 42; Estate of Frank H. Short, 9 T. C. M. 768
(1950). More recent cases so hold, Rowena S. Barnum, 19 T. C. 401 (1952) ; Jane C.
Grant, supra note 48; Stewart v. Rothensies. 114 F. Supp. 497 (E. D. Pa. 1953). The
Commissioner agrees in this interpretation. tJ. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(k)-I-(a) (4),
Example (2).
137. Cecil A. Miller, supra note 133; accord, Lily R. Reighley, supra note 15.
138. Joseph J. Lerner, supra note 134; see Jessie L. Fry, supra note 135; Elsie B.
Gale, supra note 41.
139. George T. Brady, supra note 42; accord. Joseph J. Lerner, supra note 134.
140. Joseph J. Lerner, supra note 134.
141. Cecil A. Miller, supra note 133; accord, Robert Wood Johnson, supra note 136;
Bertram G. Zilmer, supra note 42. Seldom are such promises made an express condition
in the settlement agreement. The danger is not that such a promise will jeopardize one's
rights under federal tax statutes, but rather that a finding of collusion between the
parties might invalidate the action for divorce. It is not a requisite, however, that such
understandings be reduced to writing. Where such promises have been shown, and
also that no mention thereof was made in the settlement agreement because of the danger
of a charge of collusion, the Court nonetheless has found the agreements incident to
the divorce. Bertram G. Zilmer, supra; Robert Wood Johnson, supra; See George T.
Brady, .supra note 42, where collusion was apparently not considered by the parties, but
the agreement was nonetheless found incident to the divorce, because "the change of
collusion was to be avoided". See also Estate of Frank H. Short, supra note 136.
142. See Elizabeth B.' Guggenheim, supra note 42; Tuckie G. Hesse, supra note 42.
In the Guggenheim case the Court stated: "No agreement can be more incident to a
divorce than one which does not operate until the divorce is secured and would not
operate unless the divorce was secured."
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that there had been a mutual understanding between them from
which one of the parties might feel an obligation, moral or other-
wise, which would impel the seeking of a divorce. It was in this
type of case that the Court found it necessary to consider all the
facts of the case, 14  and particularly the timing and circumstances
of the agreement.
In a series of cases the United States Courts of Appeal over-
ruled the Tax Court's interpretation as one without basis in the
statute. 44 These courts held there was no express statutory re-
quirement of positive proof that both parties jointly and positively
anticipate legal divorce or separation at the moment they signed
the agreement, nor was one "to be assumed in the absence of an
expressed requirement.' 145 On the contrary, the requirements of
the statute were not so stringent. In Lerner v. Commissioner,346
the leading case of the series, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit said that the husband need only prove the existence of the
obligation and that the payments made were intended to take the
place of alimony.
"The term 'written instrument incident to such divorce' was de-
signed, we think, only to insure adequate proof of the existence
143. A number of facts tend to indicate such a mutual understanding between the
parties. These include, but are not limited to: (1) negotiation between the parties
on a property settlement prior to divorce, Elizabeth Guggenheim, supra note 42; Robert
Wood Johnson, supra note 136; Jessie L. Fry, supra note 135; Thomas E. Hogg, supra
note 110; (2) discussion of divorce by the parties prior to execution of a settlement
agreement, Elizabeth Guggenheim, supra; Bertram Zilmer, supra note 42; Jessie L.
Fry, supra; Robert Wood Johnson, supra; (3) provision in the agreement that it shall
not prevent the parties from seeking a divorce, George T. Brady, supra note 42;
Elizabeth E. Guggenheim, supra; see Mahana v. United States, supra note 12; (4) insti-
tution of an action for divorce shortly after execution of the agreement, Jane C. Grant,
supra note 48; Elizabeth Guggenheim, supra; Robert Wood Johnson, supra; Mahana v.
United States, supra; Tuckie G. Hesse, supra note 42. Explanation of the passage of
time between execution of the agreement and institution of the action will be considered
by the Court. Bertram G. Zlhner, supra; Jessie L. Fry, supra; Estate of Frank H. Short,
supra note 136. (5) the pendency of a suit for legal separation and separation at
the time of the agreement, Mahana v. United States, supra; (6) mention of divorce
in writing, George T. Brady, supra; Robert Wood Johnson, supra; Jessie L. Fry,
supra; (7) payment of the wife's divorce trip expenses by the husband, Bertram G.
Ziliner, supra; Jessie L. Fry, supra; Elizabeth E. Guggenheim, supra; (8) provision
in the agreement that it should be in lieu of alimony and should govern all allowances
for alimony in the event of divorce, and that the agreement should survive any court
decree in such an action. Jessie L. Fry, supra.
144. Izrastzoff v. Commissioner, 193 F. 2d 625 (2d Cir. 1951), affirming, Estate
of Daniel G. Reid, 15 T. C. 573 (1950) ; Lerner v. Commissioner, supra note 134;
Feinberg v. Commissioner, 198 F. 2d 260 (3d Cir. 1952), reversing, George J. Feinberg,
16 T. C. 1485 (1951) ; Miller v. Commissioner, supra note 133. The Tax Court has
agreed that a "mutually coexistent intent for divorce upon execution of the agreement
is not a requirement" under the statute. Jane C. Grant, supra note 48. But see Frances
Hamer Johnson, 21 T. C. - No. 42 (1953) Acq., I. R. B. 1954-15, 5 ("Since we have
concluded that there was no plan on the part of either spouse to break the marriage ties
when the separation agreement was signed, we hold that the separation agreement was
not incident to the divorce . . .")
145. Izrastzoff v. Commissioner, supra note 134.
146. See supra note 134.
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of the obligation when divorce has occurred, and not to deny
relief to the husband when merely legal formalities have not
been rendered their full due. So where the payments obviously
tate the place of alimony . . . they should not be denied effect
under the statute merely because there is no evidence that di-
vorce and settlement were not contemporaneously planned and
carried out." (Emphasis added)
Ordinarily an agreement executed after the issuance of a
decree is not incident to the divorce or legal separation. Section
22(k) applies to an "instrument incident to such divorce or separ-
ation." (Emphasis added) The Court has held that the word
"such" refers to a decree of divorce, rather than the continuing
status of divorce existing thereafter,14 7 and, to be incident to a
decree, an agreement must have been executed "prior thereto or
coincident therewith. ' 14  Consequently, an agreement executed
after the issuance of a decree did not qualify. In these earlier
cases, however, the Court did not focus entirely on this require-
ment of the statute. An agreement subsequent to the decree was
found defective as much, or more, for the reason that the payments
were voluntary, and, hence not pursuant to an obligation, than for
the reason that it was not incident to the decree. 149
A subsequent modification of the original agreement or the
complete substitution of a subsequent agreement for the original
one may itself be incident to the decree at the present time. The
significant factor is the relationship of the original agreement to
the decree of court. Thus, it appears, where the original agree-
ment was incident to the decree, any later agreement in lieu of
it is incident to the decree as well.'5° Moreover, where a later agree-
ment constitutes a compromise of disputes arising under a prior
147. Frederick J. Dauwalter, supra note 21; Co,nmissioner v. Walsh, 183 F. 2d 803
(D. C. Cir. 1950), affirming, Miriam Cooper Walsh. 11 T. C. 1093 (1948) (The Court
of Appeals in the Walsh case said: " . . . 'divorce' as used in the phrase 'incident to
such divorce or separation' means more than mere status . . . [I] t refers to the actual
dissolution of the marriage ties.") ; Benjanzin B. Cox, supra note 108; Jessie L. Fry,
supra note 135; see Smith v. Commissioner, supra note 27; Charles L. Brown, supra
note 17; but cf. Commissioner v. Murray, 174 F. 2d 816, 817 (2d Cir. 1949), affirming,
Natalia Danesi Murray, 7 T. C. M. 365 (1948).
148. Benjamin B. Cox, supra note 108; accord, W. L. H. Bergen, supra note 34.
149. Frederick S. Dauwalter, supra note 21; Benjamin, B. Cox, supra note 108;
Dale E. Sharp, supra note 112.
150. Rowena S. Barnum, supra note 136; Dorothy Briggs Smith, supra note 133.
In the Barnum case, it was merely said: "This fourth agreement under which the
payments in question were made is an agreement in lieu of the third one which, as we
have explained, was 'incident to' the divorce. Accordingly, we believe the fourth agree-
ment should be held to be 'incident to' the divorce." In Smith v. Commissioner, supra
the Court of Appeals held: "The genesis of the 1937 [the original agreement] and
1944 agreements were the same-a satisfaction by the husband of his marital obligation
which continued after divorce. It follows, therefore, that since the 1937 agreement was
incident to the divorce decree, being specifically mentioned therein, that the 1944 agree-
ment was also incident thereto." (192 F. 2d at 844). See also Walsh v. Westover,
53-1 USTC 1f 9283 (S. D. Cal. 1953); but see Newton v. Pedrick, supra note 109.
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agreement incident to the decree, it is most likely to be found inci-
dent to the decree. Although the earlier cases were based on the
theory that the compromise agreement was merely a clarification
of the original agreement, the later cases appear to proceed on
the theory that the compromise of disputes by the later agreement
per se suffices to qualify it. 5 ' It would seem to follow without
question that where the court itself later modifies the support
provisions of a decree, the amended provision qualifies under the
statute,'52 and that a subsequent agreement, which supercedes a
prior one and has received the approval and adoption of the
court of divorce, would also be incident to the decree. 53
The recent opinion in Raoul Walsh 5 ' announced a new inter-
pretation by the Tax Court of the phrase "incident to such divorce
or separation". The case marks a turn by the Tax Court to the
theory that, in determining the status of a later settlement agree-
ment replacing an original one between the parties, a later agree-
ment (and even perhaps an original one) which is merely incident
to the status of divorce or separation existing after the issuance
of either such decree will also satisfy this particular requirement
of section 22(k).
In the Walsh case the husband and his wife entered into a
written settlement agreement in 1927 and the wife brought an
action for divorce shortly thereafter. At the time of the execution
of the agreement the parties contemplated divorce. In 1934 the
parties executed a second agreement reducing the amount of the
payments to be made. In 1941 the parties entered into a third
agreement, which further reduced the amounts to be paid. The
case involved the deductibility of payments made in the year 1945
pursuant to the 1941 agreement.
Previously the Tax Court had held that payments made fit
1942 and 1943 under the same agreement of 1941 did not constitute
income taxable to the wife. 5 5 The Court held:
" . . the word 'incident' in section 22(k) refers to the de-
cree of divorce and the written agreement in question must be
151. Francis V. DuPont v. United States, supra note 133; Rowena S. Barnum, supra
note 136; see Mahana v. United States, supra note 12; Helen Scott Fairbanks, supra
note 12; Antoinette L. Holahan, supra note 42. In the DuPont case, the Court of
Claims said, disposing of the issue:
"We think that the [later] written agreement made by the plaintiff to fore-
close the possibility that the divorce court would modify its divorce decree
and make it more rigorous, as against the plaintiff, than was the compromise
agreement, was a written agreement incident to the divorce decree."
152. Elsie B. Gale, supra note 41; see Francis V. DuPont v. United States, supra
note 133.
153. See Francis V. DuPont v. United States, supra note 133.
154. See supra note 102.
155. Miriam Cooper Walsh, supra note 147.
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incident to the divorce decree itself. Obviously, the agreement
of November 13, 1941, was not incident to the decrees of di-
vorce entered about fourteen years previously, and, therefore,
*. it is held that the payments in question were not tax-
able to the petitioner . "
Thereafter, a United States District Court concluded otherwise by
holding that payments made in the following year 1944 pursuant
to the agreement of 1941 were deductible by the husband, because
the 1941 agreement was incident to the divorce.1i
The recent Tax Court decision involved the deductibility of
payments made by the husband during the year 1945 pursuant to
the 1941 agreement. The single point of dispute was whether
the 1941 agreement was incident to the divorce. The Court held
that the agreement had been incident to the divorce and that its
earlier decision to the contrary was "incorrectly decided." It
found the original agreement of 1927 was incident to the divorce,
because it had been "entered into in contemplation of divorce
[and] took the place of alimony." The Court then concluded:
"Since the 1927 agreement was incident to a divorce, the subse-
quent 1941 agreement, though canceling the earlier agreements,
constituted a revision and reappraisal of the parties' position by
altering terms only and this agreement was also 'incident to a
divorce' under section 22(k)"
In the opinion the Court stated by way of dictum:
"We think that the language of the statute and the purpose of
Congress were to recognize a contractual obligation incident to
the status of a divorce, as well as an obligation under a decree,
by section 22(k) and 23 (u). Congress provided for deductions
of periodic payments 'under such decree or under a written in-
strument incident to such divorce'. The language following the
word 'decree' alternatively indicates a second criteria, that of
divorce status, as distinguished from the decree of divorce or
decree of separation."
The significance of this case depends entirely upon whether
the Tax Court limits its future application to its precise holding.
The holding of the case is not a departure from decisions by other
courts in recent years to the effect that a later amendment of the
original agreement between the parties is itself incident to a
divorce or separation if the original agreement was incident to a
divorce or separation. On the other hand, the application of the
dictum of the case to future cases which involve the status of the
original agreement between the parties would mark a substantial
155a. Walsh v. Westover, supra note 150.
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and significant departure from past decisions and would raise
numerous questions regarding the interpretation of the remaining,
interrelated requirements of the section.
In the event the proposed Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is
enacted, the interpretation of the words "incident to" will pose
no problem to payments made in the calendar year 1954 and years
thereafter. Section 71(a) (1) of the proposed Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 retains this requirement, together with the remaining
requirements of the present section 22(k), with only slight and in-
consequential changes in language. By virtue of a new and
different approach contained in another subsection, of the proposed
Code, however, payments made under a voluntary separation
agreement not incident to a decree nonetheless may qualify as a
deduction under certain circumstances.
In its consideration of this Code the Committee on Ways
and Means of The House of Representatives found that "the
present treatment discriminates against husbands and wives




Section 71(a)(2) of the proposed Code is designed to remove
this discrimination. This section is in the nature of an excep-
tion to the general rule expressed in section 71(a) (1). Like the
present section 22(k) and the proposed section 71(a) (1), this sec-
tion conditions its applicability upon the requirements that the
agreement be written and that periodic payments under the agree-
ment be made after its execution and because of the marital or
156. Referring to section 71, the report of the Committee stated:
"Present law taxes to a recipient, and allows the payor a deduction, for
periodic alimony or separate maintenance payments if the payments are a legal
obligation imposed by a court decree or by a written agreement incident
to a decree.
The attention of your committee has been called to the fact that the present
treatment discriminates against husbands and wives who have separated
although not under a court decree.
Your committee's bill extends the tax treatment described above to periodic
payments made by a husband to his wife under a written separation agreement
even though they are not separated under a court decree if they are living
apart and have not filed a joint return for the taxable year." (H. REP. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1954).
Section 71(a) (2) of the proposed Code contains this new treatment of such
payments.
"(2) Written Separation Agreement.-If a wife is separated from her hus-
band and there is a written separation agreement, the wife's gross income
includes periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) re-
ceived after such agreement is executed which are made under such agreement
and because of the marital or tamily relationship (or which are attributable
to property transferred, in trust or otherwise, under such agreement and be-
cause of such relationship). This paragraph shall not apply if the husband
and wife make a single return jointly."
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family relationship. Unlike these sections, section 71(a) (2) does
not require that an agreement be incident to one of the prescribeid
types of decrees or, indeed, to any decree. Instead, it provides, in
addition to the foregoing requirements, only that the husband
and wife shall be "separated" and shall not file a "single return
jointly" for the year.
V. Payment "Subsequent to" a Decree of Divorce or of
Separate Maintenance
The requirement of section 22(k) that payments be made
"subsequent to" a decree of divorce or separate maintenance
is unambiguous. 157 Little need be said about it. Actually, it seems
redundant, for other portions of the statute appear to prohibit
deduction of all forms of payment prior to entry of either decree.
Paynents under a voluntary separation agreement, alimony
pendente lite, support or separate maintenance payments, and
voluntary payments, all made prior to entry of a decree, run
afoul of some other provisions of the section.
Attempt has been made to transform payments made prior to n
decree into payments subsequent to a decree by means of a nuve
pro tunc order. The case Robert L. Daine5 8 was such a case. Here
the parties voluntarily separated and on January 1, 1940, entered
into an agreement in which the husband agreed to make monthly
payments to the wife. In 1944 the wife brought an action for a
separation from bed and board, and, in that year, the C'our4
rendered a decree in her favor, adopted the agreement, and en-
tered its decree mnc pro tune as of January 1, 1940, the date of
the agreement. The case involved the deductibility of payments
to the wife in 1942 and 1943. Under the statute the payments
would not have qualified, because the payments had not been made
pursuant to a decree of divorce or separate maintenance, nor had
they been made subsequent to such a decree. The husband argued,
however, that the order of the divorce court must be recognized as
a decree entered in 1940 and, therefore, these objections to de-
ductibility lacked basis.
The Tax Court rejected this argument and held the payments
non-deductible. It stated that "retroactive judgments of state
courts cannot affect the rights of the Federal Government under
its tax laws" and "a decree of a state court, in so fax as it at-
tempts to determine retroactively the status of a husband or
157. Section 71(a) (1) of the proposed Internal Revenue Code of 1954 refers to
payments "after" such a decree.
158. Robert L. Daine, supra note 25.
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wife under section 23(u) and section 22(k), is ineffective and not
binding upon this Court." Instead, it held "taxable net income
must be determined on the basis of facts as they actually existed
during the taxable years."
Similar attempts to alter retroactively the tax consequences
of payments, which did not qualify at the time of payment for
failure to satisfy other requirements of the section, have proved,
with a single exception, to be equally unsuccessful. 5 '
PAYMENTS FOR SUPPORT oF MMno CHILDREN
Apart from the foregoing five requirements conditioning the
deductibility of payments for the support of the wife, section
22(k) also makes express provision for the treatment of pay-
ments for the support of the minor children of the husband. It
provides that it shall:
I Inot apply to that part of any such periodic payment which the
terms of the decree or written instrument fix, in terms of an
amount of money or a portion of the payment, as a sum which
159. Peter Van Vlaanderen, mpra note 114 (Payments in excess of amount pro-
vided in decree; subsequent nunc pro tunc decree ordered that such increased amounts
be paid) ; Donald B. Semple, supra note 107 (Original payments designated as "property
settlement"; later nunc pro tunc order designated payments as "alimony"); Edna M.
Gilbertson, 10 T. C. M. 594 (1951) (Decree ordered monthly payments "as and for
permanent alimony and support money" without allocation of an amount or portion
thereof for the support of the minor child of the parties; subsequent retroactive amendment
of decree provided that a certain portion of each payment should be for the support of
the child.); Ned Fuller, supra note 20. (Original agreement provided for monthly
payments "within ten years" of a specified principal sum; later agreement, adopted by
court and declared to "be considered nunc pro tune' as of the date of the original agree-
ment and decree, provided for payment of sum "within eleven years".) See Robert Barry,
sufra note 27. See also I. T. 4108, 1952-2 Cum. BuLL. 113.
The single exception is the case Margaret Rice Sklar, 21 T. C. - No. 39 (1953)
Nonacq., I. R. B. 1954-15, 5, where the Court accepted a nunc pro tunc order reforming
prior orders, which had provided payments "for the support of plaintiff and their child",
to provide for payments for the support of the child alone. The Court found as a fact
that the prior orders "were in error . . . and the last order merely corrected that error",
and thereby distinguished the Van Vlaanderen case supra note 114.
Here bases existed for concluding that an error had been made originally: a
petition filed with the state court showed that payments to support the child alone pre-
viously were sought by the parties and more important, both the husband and wife had
requested the state court, on the ground of prior error, to issue the nunc pro tunc order.
This request by both parties was not only evidence of their original intent, but it had
the effect of shifting the tax liability for the amount of the payments to the husband,
with his consent, and indeed, by his own doing. This later reformation of prior orders
would not cause the federal "revenue imposts to be set at naught", Daine v. Commis-
sioner, supra, nor would it "tend to frustrate the interrelation between sections 22(k)
and 23(u)." Peter Van VFaanderen, supra. However, the Sklar decision should be
limited to the special facts stated therein or should apply only in cases in which the
showing of prior error is at least as clear and in which the husband assumes liability
for tax.
The Tax Court followed the Sklar decision in the very recent case Velma Varga-
son, 22 T. C. - No. 15 (1954), which involved the same type of nunc pro tunc order
as that in the Sklar case. Both decisions conflict with L T. 4108, 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 113.
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is payable for the support of the minor children of such hus-
band.-60
Based upon the legislative history of the section, the word
"fix" in the statute has been translated in the Regulations to
mean "specifically designate". The Regulations provide that:
"Section 22(k) does not apply to that part of any periodic
payment which, by the terms of the decree or the written in-
strament . . . is specifically designated as a sum payable for
the support of minor children of the husband."' 61
The Regulations also make provision for the situation in which
a periodic payment for the wife and children falls short of the
amounts decreed. Here the amount of the payment is applied first
to the portion or amount for the support of the children and the
balance, if any, applied to the portion of the payment for the
wife.
1 62
160. Section 71(b) of the proposed Internal Revenue Code of 1954 applies to pay-
ments for the support of minor children of the husband. It provides:
"(b) Payments to Support Minor Children.-Subsection (a) shall not apply
to that part of any payment which the terms of the decree, instrument,
or agreement fix, in terms of an amount of money or a part of the pay-
ment, as a sum which is payable for the support of minor children of
the husband. For purposes of the preceding sentence, if any payment is
less than the amount specified in the decree, instrument, or agreement,
then so much of such payment as does not exceed the sum payable for
support shall be considered a payment for such support."
Section 22(k) adopts the rule prior to its enactment. Prior to 1942 amounts paid
by a husband for the support of minor children were taxable as income to him. Hehering
v. Schweitzer, 296 U. S. 551 (1935) ; Helvering v. Stokes, 296 U. S. 551 (1935), except
where the payments were for the support of the wife and minor children and no portion
thereof was specifically designated as being for the children's support. Bok v. Rothensies,
43 F. Supp. 377 (E. D. Pa. 1942), aff'd per curiam, Rothensies v. Bok, 131 F. 2d 222
(3d Cir. 1942).
The payment may take the form of premiums upon a life insurance policy on the
husband in which the child is designated as beneficiary. Lemuel Alexander Carmichael,
supra note 62. Payments of such premiums are not deductible by the husband. Ibid.
161. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(k) -1- (d). SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess., 86 (1942) 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 568, provides:
"Section 22(k) and section 171 do not apply to that part of any periodic pay-
ment under section 22(k) . . . which, by the terms of the decree or the
written instrument . . . is specifically designated as a sum payable for the
support of minor children of the husband."
162. Ibid. The Regulations provide:
"For example, if the husband is by the terms of the decree required to pay
$200 a month to his divorced wife, $100 of which is designated by the decree
to be for the support of their minor children, and the husband pays only
$150 to his wife, $100 is nevertheless considered to be a payment by the husband
for the support of the children."
Accord, Martha I. Blyth, 21 T. C. - No. 31 (1953).
For the treatment of such payments in the proposed Internal Revenue Code of
1954, see note 160 supra.
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The Tax Court has stated that "the important consideration
.is the allocation of the payments to the support of the chil-
dren, as specified in the agreement, and not the actual use made of
the funds."103  Thus, it is immaterial that substantially all of the
funds were used for maintenance of a joint home'" or that the wife
used the entire payment for the care and support of the children. 65
On the other hand, if an agreement or decree provides pay-
ments for the support of the wife and the minor children without
a specific designation of an amount of money or portion of the
payment for the support of the children, ordinarily "the whole
of such amounts is includible in the income of the wife . . 16(
and accordingly is deductible by the husband. No portion has been
found to be so designated, for example, where payments were
ordered "for the support and maintenance of the plaintiff and of
the children herein given to her care"'167 or "for her care and sup-
port and the care and support of said minor children."' 68
The Courts will construe the instrument as a whole, however,
and examine all pertinent provisions for their ultimate effect to
determine whether the particular payments include ascertainable
amounts for the support of the children.'69 Thus,.". . .the mere
fact that the agreement provides for a single payment for support
of both the wife and children is not the controlling factor", where
"other provisions . . .may make evident that a specific sum of
the total payment is allocable to the children.' 70  The case of
Robert W. Budd'7' is a good example of this type of case. Here
the agreement provided for a payment to the wife of $500 a month
163. Leon Mandel, supra note 20.
164. Ibid.
165. Dora Moitoret, 7 T. C. 640 (1946).
166. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(k)-1- (d). The language of the regulations
was doubtless based on SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 86 (1942), 1942-2
GuM. Bu .. 568.
"If, however, the periodic payments ...are received by the wife for the sup-
port and maintenance of herself and of minor children without . . . specific
designation of the portion for the support of ... children, then the whole of
such amounts is includible in the income of the wife . . ."
Where the wife is so taxed on the whole of the payments, however, this amount,
is not considered as support for the children by the husband in determining which parent
is entitled to claim exemptions for them as dependents. INT. RF.V. CODE, § 25(b) (3)..
167. Richard P. PrickerS, 18 T. C. 872 (1952).
168. Dora H. Moitoret, smpra note 165; see Robert Wood Johnson, supra note 136;
Edna M. Gilbertson, su.ra note 159; (Payments "for permanent alimony and support
money"). See also I. T. 4108, 1952-2 Cum. BuLL. 113.
169. Harold M. Fleming, supra note 64! accord, Warren Leslie, Jr., 10 T- C. 807
(1948); Robcrt W. Budd, 7 T. C. 413 (1946), aff'd per curiam, Budd v. Commissioner,
177 F. 2d 198 (6th Cir. 1947) ; William E. Mackay, 13 T. C. M. 63 (1954) ; Charles B.
Ricks, 12 T. C. M. 700 (1953) and cases cited therein; Benjamis Davidson, supra note 64.
170. Leon Mandel, 8 T. C. M. 445 (1949), aff'd, Mandel v. Commissioner, 185 F.
2d 50 (7th Cir. 1950).
171. See note 169 supra.
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"for her support and/or alimony and the support of" the minor
son of the parties. Although no portion of the total monthly pay..
ment had been expressly so designated, the Court concluded from
the provisions of the agreement that $200 per month was iden-
tifiable as being the child's support. The agreement provided that
the payments were to be reduced to $200 per month in the event
of remarriage of the wife, to $300 per month upon the death or
majority of the son, and, if the son were sent to a college prepara-
tory school, the wife would receive $200 per month in the months
the son was not attending school. In another case, of an $18,000
yearly amount to be paid "to the wife . . . for the support of her-
self and the two children", the amount of $10,000, or $833.33 per
month, was found ascertainable for support of the children, be-
cause the payment would be reduced to $833.33 per month upon the
remarriage of the wife or, in the event of the death of a child, by
$416.66 per month.172
On the other hand, where the agreement does not show clearly
an identifiable portion of the payment for support of minor chil-
dren, the Court has refused to consider facts de hors the agree-
ment or decree in order itself to allocate a portion as being reason-
ably intended for their support.7 8
CONCLUSIOw
The elimination in the proposed Code of the requirement that
an agreement need be incident to a decree of court is an overdue
step toward modifying the unnecessarily stringent limitations in
section 22 (k). Two sound reasons justified this new approach. The
first is the expressed congressional intention to eliminate the dis-
crimination between the tax treatment accorded payments under an
agreement incident to a decree and payments under an agreement
not incident to a decree. 7 4 The second is that the reason for the
172. Leon Mandel, supra note 20; accord, Harold M. Flening and Helena P.
Fleming, supra note 64; but see Elsa B. Chapin, 6 T. C. M. 882 (1947); Dorothy New-
combe, 10 T. C. M. 152 (1951), aff'd on another ground, Commissioner v. Newcnombe,
203 F. 2d 128 (9th Cir. 1953).
A finding by the Court that a certain portion of a payment is designated for the
support of children may also affect the character of the remainder of the payment. In
the Fleming case the husband agreed to pay $200 a month from December 1, 1937, to
November 1, 1942, inclusive, and $100 a month from December 1, 1942, to March 21,
1958. The Court concluded from the provisions of the agreement that $100 a month
during both periods had been earmarked to support the child of the parties. As a result,
it was found that the husband was obligated to pay $100 a month for the wife's support
only during the five year period between 1937 and 1942. Multiplying the period of pay-
ment by the monthly payment of $100 to the wife, the Court constructed a principal
sum and held these payments also were not deductible as installment payments.
173. Elsa B. Chapin, supra note 172.
174. See supra note 156.
FEDERAL TAX CONSEQUENCES
imposition of the decree requirement no longer existed. It has
been suggested that:
"The reason for the decree requirement seems to have been a
fear that without court approval of the amounts to be paid, ex-
cessive income-splitting might be achieved-at a time when in-
come-splitting between still-married couples was not allowed."
7 5
Beginning with the Revenue Act of 1948, income-splitting by a
husband and wife has been allowed. 6
These two reasons justify further congressional liberalization
of the treatment of payments in the nature of alimony. Both ap-
ply with equal force to payments made pursuant to an interlocu-
tory decree of divorce or a decree of annulment and to alimony
pendente lite, all of which do not constitute income taxable to the
wife under section 22(k). Future congressional consideration of
the problem may tend to additional relief to the husband along
these lines.
175. See supra note 127.
176. 62 Stat. 110 (1948).
